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The Opioid Doctors: Is Losing Your License a
Sufficient Penalty for Dealing Drugs?
ADAM M. GERSHOWITZ†
Imagine that a medical board revokes a doctor’s license both because he has been peddling
thousands of pills of opioids and also because he was caught with a few grams of cocaine. The
doctor is a family physician, not a pain management specialist. Yet, during a one-year period he
wrote more than 4,000 prescriptions for opioids—roughly eighteen scripts per day. Patients
came from multiple states and from hundreds of miles away to get oxycodone prescriptions. And
the doctor prescribed large quantities of opioids—up to 240 pills per month—to patients with no
record of previously needing narcotic painkillers. Both federal and state law provides an option
to charge the doctor as a drug dealer. When a physician writes a prescription for a controlled
substance with no legitimate medical purpose, federal and state law considers it to be the same
criminal offense as a street dealer selling drugs in a back alley. Prosecutors, however, did not
charge the doctor with dealing opioids. They instead indicted him for possession of the small
amount of cocaine and ignored the opioid distribution.1
Prosecutors (and physicians) claim that there has been a massive crackdown on doctors for
improper opioid prescribing. This Article challenges that claim by detailing dozens of recent
cases in which state medical boards revoked doctors’ licenses for improper opioid prescribing
but in which prosecutors never brought any criminal charges for drug dealing. After detailing
the egregious conduct of dozens of opioid prescribers, this Article explains why prosecutors are
reticent to bring drug distribution charges against doctors and offers a roadmap for reform.

† Hugh & Nolie Haynes Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to participants
in the summer faculty workshop at William & Mary and to Stacy Kern-Scheerer for suggesting we co-teach
the course Health, Crime, and the Opioid Crisis. Alden Coffin, Karly Newcomb, and Gabby Vance provided
excellent research assistance.
1. These facts are from a real case. See infra notes 228–233 and accompanying text.

[871]

872

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:871

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 873
I. THE CHALLENGE AND RARITY OF SUSPENDING OR REVOKING
DOCTORS’ MEDICAL LICENSES ........................................................... 876
II. THE CRIMINAL LAW AUTHORIZING PROSECUTION OF DOCTORS FOR
INAPPROPRIATELY PRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ............ 883
III. REVOKING DOCTORS’ LICENSES BUT NOT PROSECUTING ....................... 885
A. NEGLIGENT MEDICAL PRACTICE ................................................. 886
B. PRESCRIBING INAPPROPRIATE QUANTITIES OF DRUGS ................ 888
C. PRESCRIBING INAPPROPRIATE TYPES OF DRUGS ......................... 890
D. PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS TO PATIENTS WHO EXHIBITED DRUGSEEKING BEHAVIOR ..................................................................... 892
E. SEX WITH PATIENTS ..................................................................... 894
F. PRESCRIBING DRUGS WITHOUT EXAMINATION ........................... 895
G. NUMEROUS INAPPROPRIATE ACTS, INCLUDING PRESCRIBING
INAPPROPRIATE QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF DRUGS AND
CONDUCTING NO EXAMINATIONS ............................................... 895
IV. LESS AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTIONS AGAINST DOCTORS .......................... 901
A. CONVICTIONS (BUT LIGHT PUNISHMENTS) FOR DEALING
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ......................................................... 902
B. ALLOWING DOCTORS TO PLEAD GUILTY TO WHITE COLLAR
CRIMES IN LIEU OF DRUG DEALING CHARGES ............................ 903
V. REASONS WHY PROSECUTORS HAVE BEEN LESS AGGRESSIVE IN
CHARGING DOCTORS WITH DRUG DISTRIBUTION ............................... 906
VI. LEGISLATURES SHOULD BETTER FUND STATE MEDICAL BOARDS,
FEDERAL AND STATE PROSECUTORS, AND MEDICAL EXPERTS ........... 911
A. AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION TO EXPAND THE STATUTE ............. 911
B. TARGETED RESOURCES FOR STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND
PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES .............................................................. 912
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 916

March 2021]

THE OPIOID DOCTORS

873

INTRODUCTION
The opioid crisis has a lot of villains. Pharmaceutical companies peddled
dangerous drugs without proper safeguards and encouraged deceptive
marketing.2 The FDA failed to properly regulate.3 The drug distributors—the
giant corporations that physically deliver the drugs—did not adequately
monitor and stop excessive drug flow.4 Pharmacies profited by selling more
pills than their local communities could legitimately consume.5 All of this bad
behavior has led to corporate criminal liability and billions of dollars in civil
litigation.6
But what about the doctors who over-prescribed the oxycodone, fentanyl,
and other opioids? Have there been adequate steps taken to punish the doctors
who actually put the drugs in the hands of patients? To be sure, federal and
state prosecutors have brought more criminal charges against doctors in recent
years.7 And with each arrest, the U.S. Department of Justice and state
prosecutors have claimed that they have cracked down on bad doctors.8
Indeed, because of high-profile prosecutions some ethical doctors fear
losing their licenses9 or being prosecuted for legitimate prescribing they

2. See BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: AN EMPIRE OF DECEIT AND THE ORIGIN OF AMERICA’S OPIOID
EPIDEMIC (2d ed. 2018).
3. See, e.g., Emily Baumgaertner, F.D.A. Did Not Intervene to Curb Risky Fentanyl Prescriptions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/health/fda-fentanyl-opioid-epidemic-overdosecancer.html.
4. See Danny Hakim, William K. Rashbaum & Roni Caryn Rabin, The Giants at the Heart of the
Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/health/opioids-lawsuitsdistributors.html.
5. See Jenn Abelson, Andrew Ba Tran, Beth Reinhard & Aaron C. Davis, As Overdoses Soared, Nearly
35 Billion Opioids—Half of Distributed Pills—Handled by 15 Percent of Pharmacies, WASH. POST (Aug. 12,
2019,
7:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/the-opioid-crisis-15-percent-of-thepharmacies-handled-nearly-half-of-the-pills/2019/08/12/b24bd4ee-b3c7-11e9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html.
6. Pills are not exclusively to blame for the opioid epidemic. Mexican drug cartels and other gangs have
flooded the streets with cheap heroin. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S
OPIATE EPIDEMIC (2015).
7. In the eighteen months between January 2017 and July 2018, the Department of Justice charged
nearly 200 physicians and over 200 other medical personnel with opioid-related crimes. See Jeff Sessions,
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks Announcing National Health Care Fraud and Opioid Takedown (June
28, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-deliversremarks-announcing-national-health-care-fraud-and); see also Josh Bowers & Daniel Abrahamson, Kicking
the Habit: The Opioid Crisis, America’s Addiction to Punitive Prohibition, and the Promise of Free Heroin, 80
OHIO ST. L.J. 787, 808–09 (2019) (describing federal efforts to cut opioid prescriptions through increased
prosecutions). Federal prosecutors have also become more aggressive in “charging the death” under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C). See Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, The Opioid Crisis and Federal Criminal Prosecution, 46
J.L., MED. & ETHICS 292, 296–97 (2018).
8. See, e.g., Sadie Gurman & Sara Randazzo, Dozens of Medical Professionals Charged in Opioids
Sting, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 2019, 7:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-medical-professionalscharged-with-illegally-prescribing-opioids-11555533761 (quoting the Department of Justice’s criminal
division chief as saying that “when medical professionals behave like drug dealers, the Department of Justice
is going to treat them like drug dealers”).
9. See Jayne O’Donnell & Ken Alltucker, Pain Patients Left in Anguish by Doctors ‘Terrified’ of
Opioid
Addiction,
Despite
CDC
Change,
USA
TODAY ,
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believe to be in the best interests of their patients.10 As one Kentucky doctor
colorfully put it, “many well-intended doctors are unfairly arrested ‘all the
time’ in the hunt for those who recklessly contribute to patients’ addictions and
fatal overdoses . . . [They are] the dolphins that get caught in the tuna net.”11
Should the “dolphin” doctors be afraid of being prosecuted for writing
opioid prescriptions? In a word, “No.” While prosecutors have begun bringing
more prosecutions for improper prescribing of opioids, there has not been a
rash of unjustifiable prosecutions. To the contrary, prosecutors have declined
to bring criminal charges against many doctors who have engaged in egregious
behavior.12
To assess how aggressive prosecutors have been in charging doctors, I
reviewed hundreds of news stories over the last few years that reported on
medical boards revoking doctors’ licenses for improper prescribing of opioids.
In the most egregious cases involving pill mills and other outrageous conduct,
prosecutors have in fact aggressively brought criminal charges. Although many
of these outrageous cases resulted in arguably lenient plea bargains and light
sentences, this Article does not focus on the lenient punishment of doctors who
were in fact prosecuted. Rather, this Article explores the dozens of cases in
which medical boards revoked doctors’ licenses for opioid prescribing
misconduct, but state and federal prosecutors brought no criminal charges. To
be clear, this Article does not argue that prosecutors would have airtight cases
against every single doctor who lost their medical licenses. Many cases,
however, involved flagrant misconduct for which federal and state prosecutors
plausibly could have brought criminal charges for drug distribution. This
Article details cases in which doctors prescribed outrageous numbers of pills,
failed to perform any medical examinations, wrote prescriptions to ordinary
patients for opioids approved only for cancer patients while taking money from
the drug manufacturer, prescribed opioids to patients clearly exhibiting drugseeking and addictive behavior, and prescribed opioids in exchange for sex.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2019/06/24/pain-patients-left-anguish-doctors-who-fear-opioidaddiction/1379636001/ (June 30, 2019).
10. See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Can Physicians
Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 35
(2016) (“There are continued concerns about the chilling effect of investigations on legitimate physician
prescribing.”); M.M. Reidenberg & O. Willis, Prosecution of Physicians for Prescribing Opioids to Patients,
81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 903, 903, 905 (2007) (contending that physicians are scared
of criminal prosecution even though the study indicated the risk of regulatory or criminal punishment was
“very small”); Beth Warren, Doctors Who Fear Being Arrested for Treating Pain to Get Unusual Help,
LOUISVILLE
COURIER
J.
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/crime/2018/08/02/kentucky-doctors-fear-arrest-treating-pain-opioids-amid-clinicraids/863407002/.
11. Warren, supra note 10.
12. See infra Part III.
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This misconduct was egregious enough for doctors to lose their medical
licenses but supposedly not serious enough for criminal prosecutions.13
Rather than a story of excessive criminal prosecutions, these cases seem
to indicate that prosecutors are relying on medical boards to protect the public
and discipline doctors who have engaged in outrageous behavior. On one level,
the use of civil rather than criminal remedies makes sense. Revoking a medical
license is a civil action that is subject to a much lower standard of proof than a
criminal prosecution.14
On the other hand, there are reasons we should expect to see criminal
prosecutions when a medical board has revoked a doctor’s license for improper
prescribing. First, the standard for criminally prosecuting a doctor for illegally
dealing drugs—a showing that the prescription was not for “a legitimate
medical purpose” and that the doctor was not acting “in the usual course of his
professional practice”15—is often similar to the reasons why a medical board
has revoked a doctor’s license.16 Second, and practically speaking, it is rare for
medical boards to revoke doctors’ licenses.17 Proceedings to suspend or revoke
medical licenses are lengthy and complicated endeavors involving medical
experts and lawyers.18 Medical boards are composed of doctors who seem
cautious about revoking the licenses of their colleagues.19 It is therefore not
surprising that when doctors have lost their licenses for improperly prescribing
opioids, the conduct has been egregious. Given the flagrant misconduct, we
should expect to see accompanying criminal prosecutions in many of those
cases. Yet, in dozens of cases, there have been no criminal charges following
the license revocations.

13. In other cases, prosecutors have charged the doctors with Medicaid fraud or health care fraud, but not
brought charges related to prescribing practices. In still other cases, doctors were prosecuted but received
extremely light sentences. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 32 (“[T]he standard for criminality is at least two steps
beyond that which would satisfy the breach requirement in malpractice: from a mistaken doctor (one breach in
otherwise careful practice) to a bad doctor (pattern indicating carelessness) to a criminal doctor (pattern
indicating knowledge or intention to violate law).”); see also infra Part II (detailing how doctors can be held
criminally liable under the Controlled Substances Act).
15. See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
17. See SIDNEY M. WOLFE, CYNTHIA WILLIAMS & ALEX ZASLOW, PUB. CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP RANKING OF THE RATE OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2009–2011, at 1
(2012), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/migration/2034.pdf (explaining that medical boards
impose serious discipline on less than one-half of one percent of physicians).
18. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
19. Just like other group members, doctors are likely susceptible to in-group bias that makes them more
prone to under-estimate misconduct by other doctors. See, e.g., Jacques-Philippe Leyens, Paola M. Paladino,
Ramon Rodriguez-Torres, Jeroen Vaes, Stéphanie Demoulin, Armando Rodriguez-Perez & Ruth Gaunt, The
Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 4
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 186, 187 (2000) (“People . . . interpret more leniently an ambiguous
behavior performed by an ingroup member than by an outgroup member [and] they excuse more readily
antinormative behaviors committed by an ingrouper than by an outgrouper . . . .”) (citations omitted).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the lengthy and
demanding process for revoking a doctor’s medical license and the resulting
rarity of it occurring. Part II then reviews the criminal statutes and regulations
that allow prosecutors to bring controlled substances distribution charges
against doctors who have inappropriately prescribed opioids and other drugs.
Part III is the heart of the Article. It describes more than two dozen recent
cases in which state medical boards suspended or revoked doctors’ licenses for
egregious opioid prescribing behavior, but for which there has been no federal
or state criminal prosecution. Part III describes cases in which doctors: (A)
prescribed inappropriate types of drugs; (B) prescribed excessively large
quantities of drugs; (C) conducted no physical examinations or laboratory tests
before prescribing drugs; (D) appeared to take kickbacks in exchange for
prescribing dangerous opioids; (E) prescribed opioids to patients who clearly
exhibited addictive and drug-seeking behavior; and (F) traded drugs for sex.
Part IV then considers cases in which prosecutors brought less serious criminal
charges against doctors but either declined to charge drug dealing or agreed to
very mild sentences. Part V seeks to explain the reasons why prosecutors fail
to be as aggressive as they could be in charging doctors for opioid drug
dealing. Part V explores the availability of easier-to-prove charges, the
downside to a vague statutory scheme, the lack of prosecution resources, the
prestige of physicians in society, as well as the effect of the recent movement
to treat pain as the fifth vital sign. Finally, Part VI proposes targeted funding
grants to medical boards and prosecutors to support more rigorous
investigation and prosecution.

I. THE CHALLENGE AND RARITY OF SUSPENDING OR REVOKING DOCTORS’
MEDICAL LICENSES
On paper, the standard for revoking a doctor’s medical license is not
insurmountably high. Most states have a laundry list of behavior—including
fraud,20 willfully making false records,21 prescribing to known drug abusers,22
pre-signing prescription pads,23 failing to conform to the standards of
acceptable and prevailing medical practice,24 and delegating prescribing tasks
to a person not licensed to do so25—that can authorize a medical board to
revoke a license. For instance, Virginia lists twenty-three reasons why its
medical board can reprimand, fine, suspend, or revoke a doctor’s license.26
Some of the reasons are extremely broad, for instance “[c]onducting his
practice in a manner contrary to the standards of ethics of his branch of the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-45 (West 2020).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1354(8) (West 2020).
See, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.14 (2020).
See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-3-.02(4) (2020).
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 11-1A-12.1.j. (2020).
See id. § 11-1A-12.1.aa.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2915 (West 2020).
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healing arts”27 or “[i]ntentional or negligent conduct in the practice of any
branch of the healing arts that causes or is likely to cause injury to a patient or
patients.”28
If a doctor is running a pill mill or otherwise misprescribing opioids, there
are typically numerous reasons for a medical board to revoke her license.29 For
example, imagine a scenario that does not rise to the level of a pill mill, but
which is nevertheless far afield from standard medical practice. Let’s say that
our hypothetical doctor is a general family physician who is running a very
busy practice and seeing one patient every ten minutes. While she is
maintaining medical records for the visits and having her staff check patients’
vital signs, the doctor is conducting little to no physical or diagnostic
examinations. Nevertheless, she falsely documents examination results in the
patients’ charts. At the busiest times of the day, the doctor permits her nurses
or staff to use her prescription pad to write a few of the prescriptions. While
the doctor is certainly not selling pills for cash, she is aware that some of her
patients are engaged in drug-seeking behavior because they have come from
hundreds of miles away, they failed earlier drug tests, or they are seeking early
refills for suspicious reasons.30 And the doctor is writing a lot of prescriptions
for opioids. Although she is a general family physician, she is writing a dozen
prescriptions for opioids per day.
Our hypothetical doctor has engaged in misconduct by failing to conduct
adequate physical examinations, by falsifying patients’ charts to hide the lack
of examination, by prescribing drugs to those likely to abuse them, and by
allowing an unauthorized individual to write prescriptions on her pad. The
doctor’s behavior is not the most egregious misconduct imaginable, but it is
certainly improper.
Are there grounds to revoke our hypothetical doctor’s medical license?
Absolutely. Consider what could happen in New Jersey, which as we shall see
in Part III below, has publicized its efforts to revoke the licenses of numerous
physicians engaged in improper opioid prescribing. Under the New Jersey
licensing rules, the medical board can point to at least half a dozen reasons to
revoke our hypothetical doctor’s license, including that she:

27. Id. § (A)(12).
28. Id. § (A)(3).
29. In an earlier study, Professor James DuBois and his colleagues studied 100 cases of improper
prescribing and categorized the character traits of the doctors. Although that study did not involve a qualitative
assessment analyzing the facts of the individual cases, the authors noted that 94% of the doctors in their
sample lost their licenses for a period of time and 64% received criminal punishment. See James DuBois, John
T. Chibnall, Emily E. Anderson, Michelle Eggers, Kari Baldwin & Meghan Vasher, A Mixed-Method Analysis
of Reports on 100 Cases of Improper Prescribing of Controlled Substances, 46 J. DRUG ISSUES 457, 463
(2016).
30. It is well known, for instance, that patients who make multiple claims that their prescriptions were
lost or stolen are often engaged in drug-seeking behavior. See 3 DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, ATTORNEYS MEDICAL
DESKBOOK § 33:10.70 (4th ed. 2018).
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• Has engaged in the use or employment of dishonesty, fraud, deception,
misrepresentation, false promise or false pretense;
• Has engaged in gross negligence, gross malpractice or gross
incompetence which damaged or endangered the life, health, welfare,
safety or property of any person;
• Has engaged in repeated acts of negligence, malpractice or incompetence;
• Has engaged in professional or occupational misconduct as may be
determined by the board;
• Has prescribed or dispensed controlled dangerous substances
indiscriminately or without good cause, or where the applicant or holder
knew or should have known that the substances were to be used for
unauthorized consumption or distribution; [or]
• Has permitted an unlicensed person or entity to perform an act for which
a license or certificate of registration or certification is required by the
board, or aided and abetted an unlicensed person or entity in performing
such an act.31

In short, on paper it would seem relatively easy to revoke the medical
license of our hypothetical doctor.
In reality, however, revoking a doctor’s license is not easy and happens
relatively rarely. On average, medical boards impose serious discipline
(revocations, surrenders, suspensions, and restrictions) on about 3 of every
1,000 doctors in a given year.32 Moreover, in some states the numbers are far
lower.33 Even when hospitals restrict doctors’ clinical privileges, state medical
boards often fail to take action. In a study of over 10,000 doctors who lost
hospital clinical privileges between 1990 and 2009, nearly 6,000 had “no state
medical board action,” even though many of those doctors also had a history of
medical malpractice payments.34 An investigation by USA Today summarized
the situation as follows:
[T]he nation’s state medical boards continue to allow thousands of
physicians to keep practicing medicine after findings of serious misconduct
that puts patients at risk . . . . Many of the doctors have been barred by
hospitals or other medical facilities; hundreds have paid millions of dollars
to resolve malpractice claims. Yet their medical licenses—and their ability to
inflict harm—remain intact.35
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-21(b)–(e), (m)–(n) (West 2020).
32. See WOLFE ET AL., supra note 17, at 1.
33. A recent study found that doctors in Delaware are disciplined four times more often than doctors in
Massachusetts. See John Alexander Harris & Elena Byhoff, Variations by State in Physician Disciplinary
Actions by US Medical Licensure Boards, 26 BRITISH MED. J. QUALITY & SAFETY 200, 204 (2017).
34. ALAN L EVINE, ROBERT OSHEL & SIDNEY WOLFE, PUB. CITIZEN, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS FAIL TO
DISCIPLINE
DOCTORS
WITH
HOSPITAL
ACTIONS
AGAINST
THEM
1–2
(2011),
https://mkus3lurbh3lbztg254fzode-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/1937.pdf.
35. Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Thousands of Doctors Practicing Despite Errors, Misconduct, USA
TODAY (Aug. 20, 2013, 7:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/08/20/doctors-licensesmedical-boards/2655513/.
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In short, conventional wisdom in the medical community is that medical
boards are under-disciplining physicians.36
There are multiple reasons for inadequate medical board discipline. First,
medical boards must recognize that a doctor is engaged in problematic
behavior. As in many fields, information flow in the medical regulatory
community is poor.37 Thus, in many cases, if there is no complaint filed about
a doctor by a patient or another physician, the medical board will have nothing
to investigate.38
Second, just like lawyers, some doctors have licenses in multiple states. If
a doctor’s license is suspended or revoked in one state, the doctor may simply
start practicing in another state. A 2018 investigation by the Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel and other media outlets found “at least 500 physicians who’ve
been publicly disciplined, chastised or barred from practicing by one state
medical board, but are allowed to practice elsewhere with a clean license.”39 In
250 instances, doctors who surrendered their license entirely in one state were
able to practice in another state.40 While the federal government maintains the
National Practitioner Data Bank, which tracks the professional and criminal
history of doctors, medical boards in some states regularly fail to search the
database.41 A recent study found that some states with significant opioid
problems—for instance, Missouri—almost never query the database.42
Third, and related, as some cases progress through the disciplinary
process, doctors will voluntarily surrender their licenses knowing that they
have a good chance of simply moving to another state and practicing there
without restrictions. According to a recent investigation, “laws in several
states—including Ohio and Maryland—require [surrender] information be kept
confidential. In others, including Wisconsin, [the fact that a doctor voluntarily
surrendered his license] may only be available through a formal open records
request.”43 While boards are required to report on voluntary surrenders that
36. See WOLFE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
37. See, e.g., Andy Marso, This Tool Can Help State Medical Boards Spot Problem Doctors. Why Do So
Few Use It?, KAN. CITY STAR, https://www.kansascity.com/news/business/health-care/article231444518.html
(June 24, 2019).
38. Indeed, scholars have observed that the most likely thing to trigger a serious medical board action
against a physician is a prior criminal prosecution. See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 25.
39. See John Fauber & Matt Wynn, 7 Takeaways from Our Year-Long Investigation into the Country’s
Broken Medical License System, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2018/11/30/medical-board-license-discipline-failures-7-takeaways-investigation/2092321002/;
John Fauber, Matt Wynn & Kristina Fiore, Prescription for Secrecy, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://projects.jsonline.com/news/2018/2/28/is-your-doctor-banned-from-practicing-in-other-states.html.
40. See John Fauber & Matt Wynn, Doctors Who Surrender a Medical License in One State Can
Practice in Another—And You Might Never Know, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, https://www.jsonline.com/
story/news/investigations/2018/11/30/doctor-good-record-might-have-troubled-history-given-up-medicallicense-elsewhere/2048657002/ (Dec. 31, 2018).
41. See Marso, supra note 37.
42. See id.
43. John Fauber & Matt Wynn, Doctors with Bad Records Can Often Still Practice on Patients; Here’s
What Needs to Happen to Fix This, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/
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happen in lieu of discipline, at least one critic argues that “[m]any medical
boards . . . work out deals or arrangements that get around the requirement.”44
Fourth, state medical boards have limited budgets and must sift through
huge numbers of complaints. In a 2006 study of state medical boards, the
average medical board received 100 complaints for every 1,000 doctors.45 On
average, each board staff member handled seventy complaints per year.46 The
heavy caseload burden makes it difficult for medical boards to build a
successful case against dangerous physicians.
Fifth, the process for suspending or revoking a medical license involves
numerous stages, multiple investigators and decision-makers, and carries
procedural protections for the doctors that can make it time-consuming and
arduous. After receiving a complaint about a doctor’s conduct, the medical
board must investigate.47 In many cases, the board must obtain medical records
for a sample group of patients—this can be time-consuming because
complainants may be reluctant to share their records and because accused
doctors (especially those represented by attorneys) may resist cooperating with
the medical board investigators.48 After obtaining the medical records, the
medical board will often seek out and assign independent doctors to review
those records to provide expert assessment.49 The accused doctors can also
retain their own experts. A hearing with witnesses and exhibits follows.50 In
the past, “hearings could be quite informal, but today such adjudicative
hearings more closely resemble a non-jury trial in a civil court.”51 In some
states, the hearing occurs before an administrative law judge who makes
findings and sends a proposed decision to the state medical board.52 The board
then makes a decision whether to revoke the doctor’s license. Thereafter, the
doctor may be able to challenge the revocation in court.53
The revocation process is rife with challenges. A report by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services on the efficacy of state medical
boards noted that “Board staff must overcome barriers to obtaining medical

investigations/2018/12/20/how-database-doctor-records-should-fixed-help-patients/2356705002/ (Dec. 31,
2018).
44. Id.
45. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG, PABLO ALIAGA & JOSEPHINE GITTLER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 22
(2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/74616/stdiscp.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 24–28.
48. See id. at 36–37.
49. See, e.g., Enforcement Process, TEX. MED. BD., http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/page/enforcement (last
visited Feb. 25, 2021).
50. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 45, at 27.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Disciplinary Process, MED. BD. OF CAL., http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Enforcement/
Disciplinary_Process.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
53. See, e.g., Leone v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 995 P.2d 191 (Cal. 2000).
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records from physicians, [and] their own understaffing.”54 Because of the need
for experts and testimony, a fully-contested revocation proceeding can cost
more than $100,000.55 Because of the steep costs of proving that a doctor
failed to meet the standard of care, boards often focus on less serious
offenses—such as failure to report information—that are easier to prove.56
Sixth, even when medical boards can navigate the process, there is still
the problem of in-group bias and leniency toward colleagues. Medical boards
are often comprised of physicians, and there is reason to believe that
professionals are reluctant to rigorously discipline their colleagues. Studies of
lawyers indicate that they are reluctant to turn in colleagues for ethics
violations.57 Critics make the same argument with respect to doctors, and with
good reason.58 A research study of doctors disciplined for criminal activity
found that 67% of insurance fraud convictions and 36% of convictions related
to controlled substances were associated with only non-severe discipline by
medical boards.59
Think back to our hypothetical doctor, who was failing to conduct
adequate examinations, falsifying patient charts, allowing others to use her
prescription pad, and writing prescriptions to those engaged in drug-seeking
behavior.60 Although there are grounds in the New Jersey regulations to revoke
her license, do you think that the medical board would do so? Based on the
obstacles described above,61 it seems more likely that our hypothetical doctor
will keep her license.
To put it in a real-world context, consider the somewhat analogous case
of Dr. Bruce Coplin of New Jersey. Undercover federal and state investigators
posed as patients and video-recorded Dr. Coplin giving them opioids in spite of
red flags.62 The investigators found that Dr. Coplin would falsely record
physical examinations that did not occur and would ignore patients’ failure to
complete x-rays he had ordered.63 On two occasions, he “blithely ignored

54. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 45, at vii.
55. See id. at 40–41.
56. See id. at vii.
57. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Challenge of Convincing Ethical Prosecutors That Their Profession
Has a Brady Problem, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 314–20 (2019); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial
Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1084–88
(2009).
58. Fauber & Wynn, supra note 43 (“Physician Sidney Wolfe, a longtime critic of lax discipline by state
boards, noted the panels are often made up largely of doctors, who can be sympathetic to those facing
discipline.”).
59. WOLFE ET AL., supra note 17, at 4; Paul Jung, Peter Lurie & Sidney M. Wolfe, U.S. Physicians
Disciplined for Criminal Activity, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 335, 342 (2006).
60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text.
62. See Bruce Coplin, Order Imposing Temporary Limitations on Practice 4, 5 n.5 (N.J. Dep’t of L. &
Pub. Safety, Div. of Consumer Affs., State Bd. of Med. Examiners, Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/Actions/20180822_25MA05198300.pdf.
63. Id. at 7.
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direct statements made to him by undercover investigators that revealed that
the ‘patients’ had engaged in diversion of pills.”64 For instance, Dr. Coplin
ignored the undercover agent’s statement that she had “sold some of her pills
for rent money.”65 Additional investigation revealed that Dr. Coplin increased
the quantity of opioids without conducting physical examinations and based
only on the patients’ subjective statements or requests for higher doses.66 Dr.
Coplin charged some patients $350 in cash for an initial visit and $125 for
“extraordinarily short follow-up visits,”67 which is a warning sign for improper
prescribing. He also pre-signed prescription pads so that staff could fill in
prescriptions for him.68
In light of this and additional evidence, the New Jersey Department of
Consumer Affairs and the state Attorney General asked for Dr. Coplin’s
medical license to be temporarily suspended immediately.69 As noted above,
the New Jersey licensing rules provide numerous grounds for revoking a
license under these circumstances.70 The medical board agreed that he was a
“clear and imminent danger”71 but would only go so far as to forbid him from
prescribing controlled substances.72 Over the objections of the state Attorney
General, the medical board allowed Dr. Coplin to continue practicing
medicine.73
***
In sum, medical boards have considerable regulatory authority to revoke
the licenses of doctors engaged in misconduct. Yet, medical boards appear to
take serious disciplinary action relatively rarely. Thus, when state medical
boards revoke doctors’ licenses for inappropriately prescribing opioids, there is
likely a very strong case that the doctors have been prescribing dangerous
drugs outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate
medical purpose. While criminal prosecution may not be appropriate in all of
those cases, it is likely appropriate in many of them. As we shall see in Part III
below, however, in many egregious cases in which medical boards revoked
doctors’ licenses for improper prescribing of opioids, prosecutors declined to
bring charges against the doctors for unlawfully distributing controlled
substances. Before turning to those cases though, Part II explores the law that
allows doctors to lawfully distribute controlled substances, and the statutes and
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 6 n.7.
68. Id. at 10 n.9.
69. Id. at 13–14.
70. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. Bruce Coplin, supra note 62, at 8.
72. Id. at 13.
73. See S.P. Sullivan, AG Cries Foul After N.J. Doctor Accused in Opioid Sting Keeps License, NJ.COM,
https://www.nj.com/politics/2018/09/ag_cries_foul_after_doctor_accused_in_sting_keeps.html
(Jan.
29,
2019).

March 2021]

THE OPIOID DOCTORS

883

regulations that permit prosecutors to bring criminal charges against doctors
for failing to comply with their statutory obligations.

II. THE CRIMINAL LAW AUTHORIZING PROSECUTION OF DOCTORS FOR
INAPPROPRIATELY PRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
Although doctors are licensed to prescribe controlled substances, it is
possible for them to do so in a way that violates federal and state criminal law.
The federal Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful “for any person
knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance.”74 However, another section of the federal criminal code specifies
that
Persons registered by the Attorney General under this subchapter to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances . . . are authorized
to possess, manufacture, distribute, or dispense such substances or chemicals
(including any such activity in the conduct of research) to the extent
authorized by their registration and in conformity with the other provisions
of this subchapter.75

Thus, if doctors are properly registered, they may possess and distribute
drugs that ordinary citizens cannot.
Physicians’ unique authority to prescribe drugs does not mean they are
not subject to restrictions however. Federal regulations provide that for “[a]
prescription for a controlled substance to be effective [it] must be issued for a
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course of his professional practice.”76 The federal regulations further provide
that “[a]n order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the usual course of
professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research is not a
prescription,” and the person issuing it “shall be subject to the penalties
provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to controlled
substances.”77
On their face, the regulations therefore indicate that doctors can be
subject to criminal liability for drug distribution if they knowingly issue a
prescription without a legitimate medical purpose outside the course of
professional practice.78 The Supreme Court embraced this interpretation over
forty years ago in United States v. Moore.79 In that case, a physician contended
that his registration exempted him from criminal liability altogether under 21

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

21 U.S.C. § 841(a).
21 U.S.C. § 822(b).
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2020).
Id.
See Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 30.
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975).
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U.S.C. § 841(a) (the primary section of the Controlled Substances Act), but the
Court disagreed and held that registration only protected “lawful acts.”80
In short, if doctors knowingly write prescriptions that are not for a
legitimate medical purpose, they are subject to criminal liability. States have
similar criminal liability regimes.81 Of course, the term “legitimate medical
purpose” is open-ended and far from clear.82 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of
Moore, courts have upheld § 841(a) drug distribution convictions when:
the physician sells prescriptions; the prescriptions are issued without any
prior, or an inadequate, physical examination of the patient; the prescription
is written by physician to a fictitious patient or to a patient not present at the
time the prescription was written; the physician is aware that the medication
is not or will not be used for a medical purpose; the physician writes
prescriptions for a patient too frequently; and the physician writes
prescriptions for a large amount of controlled substances to an individual
patient.83

Some observers have suggested that the defenses that physicians have
asserted to drug distribution charges in the past seem to be less successful in
recent cases. Two health lawyers have argued that “[r]isky prescribing without
actively verifying patient suitability for controlled substances and without
remaining vigilant throughout the course of treatment can result in [criminal
liability]. . . . Physicians can no longer rely on the defenses of good faith,
willful ignorance, trusting the patient, calculated risk, or lack of foreseeability”
to avoid criminal liability.84
Some scholars have been critical of the more aggressive prosecutions of
doctors under the Controlled Substances Act. For instance, Professor Deborah
Hellman has argued that prosecutors’ ability to bring criminal cases by
asserting that physicians have been willfully blind forces doctors to choose
between their professional duty to trust patients and a fear of criminal
liability.85 Over a decade ago, Professor Diane Hoffmann forcefully argued

80. Id. at 131.
81. See Michael C. Barnes & Stacey L. Sklaver, Active Verification and Vigilance: A Method to Avoid
Civil and Criminal Liability When Prescribing Controlled Substances, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 93, 103
(2013); Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 30.
82. See Deborah Hellman, Prosecuting Doctors for Trusting Patients, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 701, 707
(2009) (noting that the federal regulations are “problematic in application because of the failure to provide
clear standards to determine when a doctor is practicing medicine and when he is not”); Katherine Goodman,
Note, Prosecution of Physicians as Drug Traffickers: The United States’ Failed Protection of Legitimate
Opioid Prescription Under the Controlled Substances Act and South Australia’s Alternative Regulatory
Approach, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 210, 225–26 (2008).
83. Danielle M. Nunziato, Note, Preventing Prescription Drug Overdose in the Twenty-First Century: Is
the Controlled Substances Act Enough?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1285–86 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
84. Barnes & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 143–44 (footnotes omitted). Physicians can still invoke a good
faith defense, but the law is unsettled on the scope of the good faith defense. See Goodman, supra note 82, at
231–35, 243 (reviewing court decisions and arguing that an objective test “impermissibly lowers the criminal
standard into a finding of little more than medical malpractice”).
85. See Hellman, supra note 82, at 702.
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that prosecutors were too aggressive in bringing criminal charges against
doctors who prescribed opioids.86 She explained that allowing a physician to
be convicted for prescribing without a legitimate medical purpose and outside
the usual course of her professional practice:
harms not only the physicians who are arguably wrongly accused but also
the patients of these physicians and other individuals who suffer from
chronic pain. Because many physicians fear criminal sanctions for
prescribing opioids, pain sufferers may not be able to receive adequate pain
care. The law enforcement climate surrounding prescribing opioid analgesics
appears to be causing some physicians to stop prescribing opioids or stop
treating chronic pain patients, reducing an already very small number of
physicians willing to treat these needy patients. As a result, the physicians
who continue to see patients with chronic pain also make themselves an easy
target for law enforcement officials.87

Since Professor Hoffmann’s article in 2008, the opioid crisis has
exploded beyond what anyone could have predicted. Although hard numbers
are difficult to come by, it appears that as greater attention to the crisis has
increased, so too have prosecutions.88 Nevertheless, this does not mean that
prosecutors have been overly aggressive or even sufficiently aggressive in
targeting doctors who have misprescribed opioids. As Part III details below,
there have been many instances in which state medical boards suspended or
revoked doctors’ licenses but in which prosecutors did not bring criminal
charges.

III. REVOKING DOCTORS’ LICENSES BUT NOT PROSECUTING
Over the last few years, state medical boards89 have revoked the licenses
of scores of doctors because of the way they prescribed opioids. In many of
these revocations it seems clear that the state medical boards believed that the
doctors misprescribed opioids and therefore did not act with a legitimate
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice. State medical
boards have revoked doctors’ licenses for, inter alia, prescribing too many
pills,90 prescribing pills without physical examinations,91 prescribing

86. Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the
Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 235 (2008)
[hereinafter Hoffmann, Treating Pain]; see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1049, 1070 (2009) (criticizing some prosecutions and law enforcement tactics).
87. Hoffmann, Treating Pain, supra note 86, at 235 (footnote omitted).
88. See Alyssa M. McClure, Note, Illegitimate Overprescription: How Burrage v. United States Is
Hindering Punishment of Physicians and Bolstering the Opioid Epidemic, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1747,
1748 (2018).
89. States have a variety of names for the administrative bodies that license and discipline doctors. For
ease of exposition, when not talking about a specific entity, I simply use the term “medical board.”
90. See supra Part III.A.
91. See supra Part III.B.
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inappropriate types of opioids,92 and for selling pills for cash or sex,93 to name
just a few common scenarios. In many cases where the medical boards revoked
licenses, there also appears to be a compelling basis upon which prosecutors
could bring criminal charges for distributing controlled substances.
This Part analyzes more than two dozen recent cases in which medical
boards revoked or suspended doctors’ licenses but for which there was no
criminal prosecution. To be clear, this is not an exhaustive list of cases. In
some states, it is very difficult to discover when doctors have been disciplined
for improper prescribing. Thus, there are likely many cases of doctors being
disciplined for opioid prescribing that are not publicly known. The cases that
follow are those that have been the subject of media reporting.
To offer a baseline, I begin in Part III.A with cases in which the medical
boards seemingly revoked the doctors’ license for negligence and for which a
criminal prosecution for controlled substances distribution would therefore
have been inappropriate. Thereafter, I move to more worrisome cases in which
a prosecutor could have considered a criminal prosecution. As in the rest of the
criminal justice system, the strength of the cases varies. In some, the actions of
the doctors are so egregious that they seem to cry out for criminal
prosecutions. In others, it would be more challenging for prosecutors to
convince a jury that the doctors knowingly issued a prescription without a
legitimate medical purpose outside the course of professional practice. My
point here is not to argue that all of these cases would be slam dunk criminal
prosecutions. There are likely reasons—both apparent from the news reports
and unknown to the general public—that some of the cases described below
would be difficult to prosecute. Thus, to be very clear, I am not suggesting that
every one of the doctors below should have been criminally prosecuted. Nor
am I arguing that prosecutors never mistakenly bring charges against
defendants who should not have been swept up in the criminal justice system.
Instead, I am seeking to make a descriptive claim at a broad level: The cases
detailed below indicate that, as a general matter, prosecutors are erring on the
side of non-prosecution for doctors involved in the opioid crisis.
A. NEGLIGENT MEDICAL PRACTICE
Before delving into the cases with more egregious facts, I want to pause
to distinguish “traditional” medical negligence cases. It may offer some
perspective to consider a few cases in which doctors lost their licenses for
being sloppy or exercising poor medical judgment. To put matters simply,
these cases seem not as bad as the behavior of the doctors in the Subparts
below. As such, it is not surprising that we do not see criminal prosecutions
arising out of these cases.

92. See supra Part III.C.
93. See supra Part III.E.
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For instance, in 2017, the Kentucky Medical Board revoked Dr. David
Swan’s medical license in large part because he was prescribing
inappropriately high doses of Suboxone, specifically the drug buprenorphine.94
That drug is a partial agonist that blocks opioid receptors in the brain.95 At
twenty-four milligrams, all of the receptors in the brain will be blocked and
thus additional dosing is fruitless and poses an unnecessary danger.96 Yet, Dr.
Swan prescribed patients thirty-two milligrams of the drug.97 A doctor who
consulted for the Kentucky Medical Board described Dr. Swan’s dosing of the
drug to show “gross ignorance of the applicable standards.”98 However,
nothing in the Medical Board’s lengthy order revoking Dr. Swan’s license
indicated criminal activity.
Even when deaths occurred, it is possible that the cases merit action by
the medical board but not prosecutors. For example, the State of Washington
suspended the license of Dr. Ann Kammeyer because she was improperly
prescribing opioids in potentially lethal doses and in dangerous combinations
of drugs.99 In fact, two of her patients died.100 Although, Dr. Kammeyer was a
family physician rather than a pain management specialist, over fifty percent of
her patients saw her for pain.101 The state medical commission found that Dr.
Kammeyer was “prescribing pain medications to patients with insufficient and
often missing diagnoses, treatment plans, charting, monitoring, pain
management referrals and insufficient safeguards to minimize the risk of drug
diversion and abuse.”102 The medical board’s findings paint a picture of a
doctor who was negligently prescribing opioids, but not one who was
knowingly prescribing drugs with no legitimate medical purpose.103
These cases are frightening but probably not criminal. While the doctors
should not have been writing the opioid prescriptions they issued, there is no
evidence that they knew there was no legitimate medical purpose for the
prescriptions. The cases detailed below present factual situations that would
more easily lend themselves to criminal prosecution.

94. See David S. Swan, M.D., Order of Revocation Case No. 1746, at 7 (Ky. Bd. of Med. Licensure, Feb.
17, 2017), http://www.state.ky.us/agencies/kbml/finalorders/15641.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7–8.
97. Id. at 15.
98. Id.
99. See Jennifer Sullivan, Marysville Doctor’s License Suspended After 2 Patient Deaths, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/marysville-doctor/.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sharon Salyer, Marysville Doctor Loses License over Opioid Prescriptions, HERALDNET (Feb. 8,
2016, 9:44 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/marysville-doctor-loses-license-over-opioid-prescriptions/.
103. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2020).
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B. PRESCRIBING INAPPROPRIATE QUANTITIES OF DRUGS
In many cases, doctors were caught prescribing far too many pills or
prescribing doses that far exceeded the standard of care. Yet, in a number of
recent cases, prosecutors have declined to bring charges even though medical
boards have revoked doctors’ licenses.
Dr. Joel Glass—a psychiatrist—lost his medical license after prescribing
massive quantities of opioids.104 The New Jersey State Medical Board found
that he prescribed more than 33,000 oxycodone pills to a single patient in a
period of roughly two years without conducting any physical examinations.105
That amounts to roughly forty pain pills per day. In another case, he prescribed
over 42,000 pills to one patient over a five-year period without conducting a
physical examination or any diagnostic tests.106
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was involved in the
investigation of Dr. Glass, and the New Jersey Attorney General commented
that a patient “could not have taken all the drugs allegedly prescribed to him by
this doctor and survived.”107 Despite the DEA’s involvement and the strong
statement from the state Attorney General, there appears not to have been any
federal or state criminal prosecution for controlled substances distribution.108
In another New Jersey case, the medical board revoked the license of Dr.
Eddie Gamao for consistently prescribing excessive doses of opioids to more
than 100 patients.109 During a one-year period, he prescribed more than
150,000 units of OxyContin and exceeded recommended doses in 80% of the
prescriptions.110 Over a “one-year period, he prescribed more than 9,000
oxycodone pills in the strongest available” dosage to an 88-year-old woman
and two members of her family.111 The doses were more than triple what was
recommended by the CDC.112 There appears not to have been any state or
federal prosecution.113

104. See Celeste E. Whittaker, Marlton Doctor’s License Permanently Revoked, COURIER POST (Nov. 16,
2017), https://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/crime/2017/11/16/marlton-doctor-has-licensedpermanently-revoked-board-medical-examiners-permanently-revokes-license/871160001/.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Tom Davis, South Jersey Doctor 32nd NJ Physician to Lose Job in Statewide Opioid Crackdown,
PATCH (May 24, 2017), https://patch.com/new-jersey/oceancity/32nd-n-j-doctor-loses-jobs-statewide-opioidcrackdown.
108. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
109. See Nick Muscavage, Piscataway Doctor Loses Medical License for Overprescribing Painkillers,
MYCENTRALJERSEY.COM
(Nov.
30,
2018,
3:04
PM),
https://www.mycentraljersey.com/story/news/health/2018/
11/30/dr-eddie-gamao-loses-medical-license-painkillers/2164068002/.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
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The Florida Medical Board eventually revoked the license of Dr. Mark
Kantzler after a patient died during experimental stem cell treatments.114
Previously, there had been medical malpractice lawsuits against him for
accusations that he “overprescribed pain medication” to three patients who
overdosed and died.115 He was not prosecuted. 116
In Tennessee, Dr. Michael Tittle—a dentist—agreed to give up his
medical license after “admitting to giving about 200 opioid prescriptions to a
handful of patients despite questionable justification in his medical records.”117
Dr. Tittle had written seventy-one opioid prescriptions—each with an average
of ten pills—to a single patient in the span of six months.118 In another case,
Dr. Tittle had allegedly prescribed 110 tablets of opioids to an individual, even
though there was “no documentation of the patient ever being seen in the
office.”119 It appears he was not prosecuted.120
In Michigan, the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
temporarily suspended the medical license of Dr. Zeyn Nez Seabron.121 The
regulatory body found that Dr. Seabron was at the very top of prescribers for
oxycodone and oxymorphone in the entire state of Michigan.122 During a ninemonth period, he wrote 5,809 prescriptions for controlled substances, of which
99.19% were for oxycodone and oxymorphone.123 Assuming a five-day work
week, that amounts to roughly thirty prescriptions of opioids per day. During
that time period, patients paid cash for 27.11% of the prescriptions, which is
“several times the state average of approximately 10% for cash payment and
suggests that prescriptions were filled for illegitimate purposes.”124 The drugs
oxycodone and oxymorphone are often diverted.125 Neither federal nor state
prosecutors have brought charges against Dr. Seabron.126

114. Stephen Hobbs, Florida Takes Away License of Doctor with Troubled Past, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL
(Nov. 17, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/health/fl-doctor-discipline-kantzler-20171117story.html.
115. Id.
116. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
117. Brett Kelman, Tennessee Dentist Wrote 71 Opioid Prescriptions to a Single Patient in Just Six
Months,
TENNESSEAN
(Nov.
15,
2018,
12:17
PM),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2018/11/15/opioids-tennessee-dentist-prescriptionabuse/2011601002/.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
121. Zeyn Nez Seabron, M.D., Order of Summary Suspension (Mich. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulatory
Affs., Bureau of Pro. Licensing, Bd. of Med., Disciplinary Subcomm., June 21, 2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/lara/Seabron_626409_7.pdf.
122. Id. at 3–4.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. See Jacob A. Lebin, David L. Murphy, Stevan Geoffrey Severtson, Gabrielle E. Bau, Nabarun
Dasgupta & Richard C. Dart, Scoring the Best Deal: Quantity Discounts and Street Price Variation of
Diverted Oxycodone and Oxymorphone, 28 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 25, 25–26 (2019).
126. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
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The Arkansas Medical Board suspended the license of two pain clinic
doctors who at one time practiced together.127 In a search warrant for their
office, the DEA alleged that the two doctors wrote a combined total of two
million doses of opioids in just a two-year period.128 Dr. Donald Hinderliter
prescribed more than 800,000 doses of opioids to just 462 patients.129 Worse
yet, Dr. Cecil Gaby prescribed more than 1.1 million doses of opioids to only
347 patients. Four of their patients died from overdoses.130 According to a
news report, a former patient of Dr. Gaby said that he “runs a pill mill . . . a
person can obtain any amount of pharmaceutical narcotics. This is known to
everyone in the pill world.”131 Wal-Mart pharmacies had placed both doctors
on a “Do Not Fill List.”132 Although the DEA executed a search warrant,
which was unsealed in November 2018, and Dr. Gaby had his license
suspended,133 to date there have been no criminal charges.134
C. PRESCRIBING INAPPROPRIATE TYPES OF DRUGS
The tragedy of the opioid crisis is not just patients with no need for
opioids receiving them. For many patients in severe pain, opioids may have
been appropriate. But there are different types of opioid drugs.135 Some
painkillers are incredibly powerful and are not intended for traditional pain.136
Nevertheless, drug companies pushed these powerful painkillers for the
mainstream marketplace even though they were not approved for that
purpose.137 To help them, the pharmaceutical companies hired doctors as
speakers and thought leaders.138 These doctors became top prescribers of the
powerful opioids and doled them out to patients who likely did not need such
powerful and dangerous drugs.139
The case of Dr. Kenneth Sun is a good example of a doctor who
seemingly could have been prosecuted by either state or federal prosecutors for
distributing the wrong type of controlled substance. Between 2012 and 2016,
127. See Dave Hughes, 2nd Arkansas Doctor in Pain-Pill Case Loses His License, ARK. DEMOCRAT
GAZETTE (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/feb/14/2nd-physician-inpain-pill-case-loses-h/.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Federal Investigators Claim Local Doctors Over Prescribed Opioids, Causing 4 Patient Deaths,
KFSM 5NEWS (Nov. 27, 2018), https://5newsonline.com/2018/11/27/federal-investigators-claim-localdoctors-over-prescribed-opioids-causing-4-patient-deaths/.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
135. See Evan Hughes, The Pain Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/05/02/magazine/money-issue-insys-opioids-kickbacks.html.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. (describing how Insys, an Arizona pharmaceutical company whose only product was Subsys,
a highly potent opioid, pursued and hired doctors to be speakers).
139. See id.
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Dr. Sun prescribed Subsys—an extremely powerful fentanyl-based opioid
painkiller approved only for cancer patients—to nearly 800 patients who did
not have cancer.140 Subsys is so powerful that it “is up to 100 times more
potent than morphine.”141 It simply should not be used for patients suffering
traditional pain. In a review of the medical records for eight of Dr. Sun’s
patients, the medical board found that:
Sun failed to periodically make reasonable effort to stop the use of the
prescribed opioid or to take any other steps in an effort to reduce the
potential for abuse or the development of physical or psychological
dependence. Moreover, Respondent failed to keep accurate and complete
medical records for each of the eight Subsys patients at issue, and in some
instances maintained within his patient record documentation which
mischaracterized the patients’ diagnoses and/or the etiology of their pain.142

The nearly 800 Subsys prescriptions generated almost $5 million in
revenue for the drug’s manufacturer.143 At the same time, the manufacturer
paid Dr. Sun over $117,000 in speaking and consulting fees related to the
drug.144
The medical board temporarily suspended Dr. Sun’s license in December
2016, and nearly two years later, it revoked his license altogether.145 In New
Jersey, the civil arm of the Attorney General’s Office appeared before the
medical board to advocate for discipline, and the Attorney General repeatedly
commented about Dr. Sun’s case. Nearly a year before Dr. Sun’s license was
permanently revoked, the Attorney General said “[t]his kind of profit-based
drug dispensing is what you’d expect from a street-corner dealer, not a trusted
health care provider.”146 And at the time of the license revocation, the Attorney
General’s office patted itself on the back by explaining, “Dr. Sun pushed a
dangerous opioid painkiller on patients who didn’t need it and weren’t
approved to receive it. The revocation of Dr. Sun’s license is simply the latest
in a growing list of actions we are taking against the doctors who have fueled
this public health crisis.”147
140. Press Release, N.J. Off. of the Att’y Gen., NJ Board of Medical Examiners Revokes License of
Doctor Who Accepted $117,000 from Drug Maker to Prescribe Highly-Restricted Painkiller “Subsys” to
Patients
for
Whom
the
Drug
Was
Not
Intended
(Sept.
10,
2018),
https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases18/pr20180910b.html.
141. Gabrielle Emanuel & Katie Thomas, Top Executives of Insys, an Opioid Company, Are Found Guilty
of Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/health/insys-trial-verdictkapoor.html.
142. Press Release, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. S.P. Sullivan, ‘Keep Them Rolling’: N.J. Doctor Accused of Pushing Dangerous Painkiller on
Patients,
N.J.COM,
https://www.nj.com/politics/2017/10/keep_them_rolling_nj_doctor_accused_of_pushing_dan.html (Jan. 16,
2019).
147. See Press Release, supra note 140.
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Yet, despite taking credit for revoking the licenses of dangerous doctors
like Dr. Sun, the New Jersey Attorney General never brought a criminal
prosecution for controlled substances violations against him. Nor did federal
prosecutors.148 The only criminal charges brought against Dr. Sun was a June
2019 indictment for taking bribes and kickbacks from the manufacturer of the
opioid Dr. Sun prescribed.149
Nor was Dr. Sun the only New Jersey doctor to prescribe inappropriate
drugs. Indeed, some doctors prescribed opioids even though they did not see
patients for pain management. For instance, the New Jersey State Board of
Medical Examiners suspended the license of a podiatrist after discovering that
he had prescribed medication unrelated to podiatry to thirteen patients.150 Dr.
James Ludden prescribed large quantities of fentanyl and other drugs to a
patient, and he also wrote prescriptions for the patient’s 93-year-old mother,
even though Dr. Ludden never examined her.151 Fentanyl is an incredibly
powerful opioid that is thirty to fifty times more powerful than heroin.152 In
2016, fentanyl was responsible for one-third of the nearly 65,000 fatal opioid
overdoses in the United States.153 Fentanyl was, most famously, responsible for
the overdose deaths of musicians Tom Petty and Prince.154 Dr. Ludden’s
patient, who was prescribed fentanyl, was later found dead in a hotel room at
his son’s wedding.155 Neither federal nor state prosecutors brought criminal
charges against the podiatrist for improperly prescribing one of the most
powerful opioids on the market.156
D. PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS TO PATIENTS WHO EXHIBITED DRUG-SEEKING
BEHAVIOR
Doctors must be cautious not to give drugs to patients who will “divert”
them or otherwise abuse the drugs. For instance, if a doctor believes that a
patient is selling the drugs to other individuals, the physician should obviously
148. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
149. New Jersey/Pennsylvania Doctor Indicted for Accepting Bribes and Kickbacks from Pharmaceutical
Company in Exchange for Prescribing Powerful Fentanyl Drug, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 25, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-jerseypennsylvania-doctor-indicted-accepting-bribes-and-kickbackspharmaceutical-company. Dr. Sun plead guilty to these charges in November 2019. New Jersey/Pennsylvania
Doctor Pleads Guilty to Accepting Bribes and Kickbacks in Exchange for Prescribing Powerful Fentanyl
Drug, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-jerseypennsylvania-doctorpleads-guilty-accepting-bribes-and-kickbacks-exchange.
150. James Ludden, D.P.M., Consent Order of Temporary Suspension of License and NJ CDS
Registration 2 (N.J. Dep’t of L. & Pub. Safety, Div. of Consumer Affs., State Bd. of Med. Examiners, Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/Actions/20161028_25MD00212700.pdf.
151. Id.
152. David Browne, Music’s Fentanyl Crisis: Inside the Drug that Killed Prince and Tom Petty, ROLLING
STONE (June 20, 2018, 2:51 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/musics-fentanyl-crisisinside-the-drug-that-killed-prince-and-tom-petty-666019/.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See James Ludden, D.P.M., supra note 150.
156. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
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not issue another prescription. Similarly, if the doctor believes a patient is
addicted and is not following dosing instructions, the doctor should not
continue to write prescriptions. Medical boards have revoked the licenses of
doctors who prescribed opioids to patients exhibiting diversionary or drugseeking behavior. Prosecutors, in some cases, have declined to bring criminal
charges.157
The Virginia Board of Medicine revoked the license of Dr. Brian Bittner
because he continued to prescribe drugs to patients who exhibited addictive
behavior.158 For instance, a patient repeatedly and unconvincingly claimed that
her OxyContin prescription had been stolen, yet Dr. Bittner continued to write
her further pain medicine prescriptions.159 For another patient with indications
of substance abuse problems, Dr. Bittner “continued to prescribe abusable
controlled substances . . . after [the patient] had been voluntarily committed or
self-admitted for inpatient and outpatient substance abuse.”160 In a review of
seventeen patient files, the medical board documented numerous other
instances in which Dr. Bittner prescribed opioids to patients who had
implausible claims that their previous prescriptions were lost, stolen, or that
their medication otherwise ran out prematurely.161 Neither federal nor state
prosecutors brought criminal charges.162
In Oklahoma, the State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision
revoked the license of Dr. Tamerlane Rozsa, who was the state’s number one
prescriber of promethazine and codeine.163 Codeine is an opiate and, when
mixed with soda, is known on the street as “lean.”164 Dr. Rozsa was known as
the “Queen of Lean.”165 The evidence presented during her license revocation
hearing demonstrated that she “supplied drug dealers and drug abusers with
prescriptions.”166 The evidence supported the conclusion that Dr. Rozsa

157. Some scholars would applaud the lack of criminal charges in this Subpart because they believe
doctors should not be prosecuted for trusting their patients. For instance, Professor Deborah Hellman has
argued that these cases often involve negligence by the doctor or a prosecution theory of willful blindness and
that holding doctors criminally responsible for distribution under those circumstances is unfair. See Hellman,
supra note 82, at 704; see also Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 17 (“Labeling physicians as misprescribers
for merely being fooled is improper.”).
158. Michael Thompson, Hanover Doctor’s License Ordered to Be Revoked, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Nov. 7, 2016), https://richmond.com/news/local/hanover/article_5959111a-12f6-572b-8e56-77fe742a8c23.
html.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. Brian Christopher Bittner, M.D., Order Case Nos. 160076, 170834 & 171883 (Va. Bd. of Med., Oct.
31, 2016), http://www.dhp.virginia.gov/Notices/Medicine/0101230106/0101230106Order10312016.pdf.
162. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
163. Randy Ellis, Court Upholds License Revocation for Tulsa Doctor Accused of Overprescribing,
OKLAHOMAN (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://oklahoman.com/article/5564308/court-upholds-licenserevocation-for-tulsa-doctor-accused-of-overprescribing.
164. See id.; Roy Cherian, Marisa Westbrook, Danielle Ramo & Urmimala Sarkar, Representations of
Codeine Misuse of Instagram: Content Analysis, 4 JMIR PUB. HEALTH & SURVEILLANCE, 2018, at 1, 4.
165. Ellis, supra note 163.
166. Id.
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“disregarded urine samples indicating patients with prescriptions were not
taking their prescriptions but were using them for other purposes.”167
According to a news report, Dr. Rozsa “saw patients at all hours of the night
and prescribed potentially lethal dosages of what patients requested, not what
was medically necessary. She accepted only cash.”168 Although her license was
revoked, prosecutors did not bring criminal charges.169
E.

SEX WITH PATIENTS

Physicians across the country have lost their licenses for having sex with
patients.170 Some of these doctors were simultaneously prescribing opioids
while engaging in sexual relationships with patients.
In Maryland, Dr. Joseph Randall surrendered his medical license (rather
than contest the medical board charges) after allegations from multiple women
that he exchanged opioid prescriptions for sex.171 A patient with a history of
drug abuse told investigators that Dr. Randall “demanded sex in exchange for
writing prescriptions for controlled dangerous substances” and that
“[p]harmacy records show[ed] that Randall continued to write the woman
more than 40 prescriptions for controlled dangerous substances between
October 2012 and October 2014, even after the woman had been discharged
from the practice.”172 In addition to demanding sex from women in exchange
for narcotics, the medical board also accused Dr. Randall of “over-prescribing
controlled-dangerous substances, keeping inadequate records, and not
adequately recommending alternate forms of pain management such as
physical therapy.”173 No criminal charges were filed based on his opioid
prescribing.174
In Tennessee, Dr. Frederick Hodges lost his license for having sex with
patients and writing improper opioid prescriptions. According to the local
newspaper, “Hodges’ actions violated the Tennessee Medical Practice Act,
which prohibits dispensing controlled substances not in the course of

167. Id.
168. Shannon Muchmore, Tulsa Doctor’s License Suspended After Dangerous Prescribing Methods
Found, TULSA WORLD, https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/tulsa-doctor-s-license-suspended-after-dangerousprescribing-methods-found/article_ce0184cb-1aa8-56be-9b0b-6698aa6d45ef.html (Feb. 13, 2019).
169. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
170. See Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Improper or Immoral Sexually Related Conduct Toward
Patient as Ground for Disciplinary Action Against Physician, Dentist, or Other Licensed Healer, 59 A.L.R.4th
1104 (1988 & Supp. 2020).
171. Daniel Leaderman, Md. Doctor Surrenders License After Sex-for-Drugs Claims, DAILY REC. (Aug.
29, 2016), https://thedailyrecord.com/2016/08/29/md-doctor-surrenders-license-after-sex-for-drugs-claims.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets since that time did not turn up criminal
charges.
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professional treatment and not keeping proper records.”175 He was not
prosecuted.176
F.

PRESCRIBING DRUGS WITHOUT EXAMINATION

Some doctors have prescribed opioids without conducting any physical
examinations or diagnostic imaging tests. In some cases, it appears the doctors
were simply selling drugs out of their offices—patients would pay a fee
(ostensibly for the office visit) and leave with an opioid prescription. In other
instances, doctors were generally running reputable medical practices but overprescribing to some patients.
For instance, in July 2014, Dr. Binod Sinha was caught on video selling
an opioid prescription to an undercover investigator for $200 in cash.177
Thereafter, when investigators sought information on that patient, Dr. Sinha
created a fake medical record.178 Eventually, in December 2017—more than
three years after being caught on tape—the New Jersey Board of Medical
Examiners revoked his license.179 The medical board found that he had
engaged in “egregious misconduct” and “wildly indiscriminate prescribing.”180
While the board ordered Dr. Sinha to pay over $200,000 in civil fines and
reimbursements,181 it does not appear that state or federal prosecutors brought
any criminal charges.182
As detailed in Part III.G below (which discusses doctors engaging in
multiple types of misprescribing), the failure to conduct any physical or
diagnostic examination runs hand-in-hand with other serious violations of the
standard of care. For instance, doctors who fail to conduct physical
examinations also often prescribe too many pills or allow nurses and staff to
write prescriptions on their behalf. Part III.H below describes these multifactored cases.
G. NUMEROUS INAPPROPRIATE ACTS, INCLUDING PRESCRIBING
INAPPROPRIATE QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF DRUGS AND CONDUCTING NO
EXAMINATIONS
Some doctors have violated the standard of care in so many ways that
their cases defy categorization. This Subpart combines those cases together
175. Ron Maxey, Whitehaven OB/GYN Loses License for Having Sex with More Than 10 Patients, COM.
APPEAL (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2017/11/17/whitehaven-ob-gynloses-license-having-sex-more-than-10-patients/875802001/.
176. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
177. Susan Loyer, Middlesex County Pain Management Doctor’s License Revoked, MY CENTRAL JERSEY
(Dec. 22, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.mycentraljersey.com/story/news/crime/2017/12/22/middlesex-countypain-management-doctors-license-revoked/976408001/.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
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under the heading of “numerous inappropriate acts.” Notably the number of
doctors engaged in numerous inappropriate acts far exceeds the number of
cases in the other categories discussed above.
The case of Judson Somerville is particularly egregious. Dr. Somerville
operated pain clinics in Laredo and Corpus Christi, Texas, though he failed to
properly register the clinics with the state medical board.183 In an audit of Dr.
Somerville’s records, the Texas Medical Board found that 201 of 219 patients
seen at the Corpus Christi location in June 2013 received a prescription for
opioids or other pain drugs.184 Dr. Somerville authorized and permitted his
employees to use pre-signed prescription pads to issue Schedule II controlled
substances while he was on vacation.185 Records from Wal-Mart and
Walgreens demonstrated that those pharmacies “filled dozens of prescriptions
issued and refills authorized in [Dr. Somerville’s] name, most of them for
opioids and other pain medications during weeks . . . when [Dr. Somerville]
was on vacation and away from his clinics.”186 The medical board’s
investigation found that Dr. Somerville failed to conduct adequate medical
histories of his patients and failed to perform any physical examinations on
patients after their first visits, “even when they reported new locations or
triggers for the pain.”187 He diagnosed some patients with lumbar disc
disorders with myelopathy (essentially, a spinal cord injury)188 without doing
imaging studies.189 The board further found that Dr. Somerville “made
diagnoses that did not seem to correspond to any of the chief complaints or
physical examination findings.”190
In an audit of sixteen patients, the board found that Dr. Somerville had
prescribed “large doses of potent opioids to nearly every patient, at nearly
every visit.”191 Although the standard of care required chronic pain patients to
be seen at least monthly, patients went several months between visits.192 Dr.
Somerville instead did much of his prescribing by phone, making it impossible
to tell how phoned-in prescriptions related to patients’ treatment plans.193
The board also found that Dr. Somerville “habitually increased
medications and/or dosages even though there was little evidence that opioid
183. Judson Jeffrey Somerville, M.D., Final Order 2 (Tex. Med. Bd., Aug. 25, 2017),
https://public.tmb.state.tx.us/BoardOrders/ViewBoardOrders.aspx?ID_NUM=313217&SESSION_ID=101907
2360 (follow “8/25/2017” hyperlink).
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id. at 6–7.
188. “Myelopathy is an injury to the spinal cord due to severe compression that may result from trauma,
congenital stenosis, degenerative disease or disc herniation.” Myelopathy, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/myelopathy (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
189. See Judson Jeffrey Somerville, M.D., supra note 183, at 7.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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therapy was effective at relieving their pain and improving their functions.”194
Dr. Somerville “prescribed doses of some pain medications that were so high
they posed a serious risk of toxicity and overdose to his patients.”195 For
instance, in one of the audited patient files, Dr. Somerville prescribed 550
doses of injectable Demerol over a five-month period even though Demerol is
so dangerous and addictive that some emergency rooms will not use it.196
The medical board found additional shocking facts. For instance, four of
the sixteen patients reported that their medications had been stolen and
requested early refills, which is a sign of drug abuse.197 Five of the sixteen
patients reviewed by the medical board “traveled long distances” to see him,
which the board concluded “is a sign of potential abuse or diversion.”198
Finally, three of Dr. Somerville’s patients died of drug overdoses within days
of receiving prescriptions from him.199
At the same time that Dr. Somerville was engaged in all of the violations
detailed above, he was paid $67,000 by the maker of Subsys200—the same
powerful and addictive opioid for cancer treatment that contributed to
revocation of other physicians’ licenses.201 Not surprisingly, Dr. Somerville
was a top prescriber of Subsys.202
The Texas Medical Board revoked Dr. Somerville’s license in 2017.203
Despite the excessive prescribing, pre-signed prescription pads, three patient
deaths, and numerous other violations, it does not appear that federal or state
prosecutors have brought criminal charges.204
Other physicians have lost their licenses for prescribing inappropriate
types and quantities of drugs. For instance, according to news reports, Dr.
Mahmood Ahmad lost his Alaska medical license for inappropriately
prescribing Subsys and for prescribing too many pills.205 Dr. Ahmad
dramatically increased his prescriptions of Subsys from fifty in total to 1,450
over a two-year period after being “wined and dined” and receiving large
speaker fees from the manufacturer.206 Dr. Ahmad had medical licenses in
multiple locations and was spending one week a month in Alaska. The medical
194. Id. at 9.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 11.
198. Id. at 10.
199. Id.
200. See Katie Thomas, Using Doctors with Troubled Pasts to Market a Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/drug-maker-gave-large-payments-to-doctors-withtroubled-track-records.html#:~:text=Dr.,drug%20companies%20make%20to%20physicians.
201. See supra notes 140–144 and accompanying text.
202. See Thomas, supra note 200.
203. Judson Jeffrey Somerville, M.D., supra note 183.
204. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
205. Jill Riepenhoff, Case Study: Dr. Mahmood Ahmad, WAFF 48, https://www.waff.com/
2018/08/22/case-study-dr-mahmood-ahmad/ (Aug. 22, 2018).
206. Id.
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board alleged that he wrote 179 prescriptions in a three-day visit to Alaska.207
Dr. Ahmad was not criminally prosecuted. 208
The West Virginia Medical Board initially suspended and then three years
later revoked the license of Dr. Phillip Fisher, who treated seven patients who
fatally overdosed.209 The medical board alleged that he was involved in sexual
relationships with three women who he was prescribing drugs to.210 One
woman who lived with Fisher allegedly overdosed from a fentanyl patch that
another patient had returned to Dr. Fisher.211 The board also contended that Dr.
Fisher prescribed multiple opioids to a woman “without monitoring her or ever
giving her a urine drug screen or doing a pill count.”212 The board found that
Dr. Fisher “developed and maintained a romantic relationship with that woman
while she was his patient.”213 The board found that Dr. Fisher continued to
prescribe opioids to patients who he knew were misusing the drugs.214 In the
case of another patient who died, the board found that Dr. Fisher prescribed
opioids even though the patient missed several appointments and “was
obtaining multiple prescriptions for controlled substances from other providers
and using different pharmacies to fill them.”215 In yet another case, the board
concluded that Dr. Fisher was prescribing drugs to a patient who he had not
seen in almost a year and while knowing that the patient was obtaining
painkillers from multiple doctors.216 There is no record of a criminal
prosecution against Dr. Fisher.217
The Illinois disciplinary board charged with overseeing physicians
suspended the license of Dr. Raman Popli after a lengthy DEA investigation.218
Investigators found that Dr. Popli prescribed more than 350,000 units of
controlled substances over a two-year period.219 When two undercover agents
came to Dr. Popli’s office complaining of soreness, he prescribed opioids to

207. Alex DeMarban, Pain Doctor Defends His Practice in Effort to Save His License, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/crime-justice/2016/05/27/pain-doctor-defends-his-practicein-effort-to-save-his-license/ (June 27, 2016).
208. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
209. Natalie Belville, WV Pain Clinic Physician Barred from Resuming Practice, STATE J. (June 9, 2016),
https://www.wvnews.com/statejournal/news/wv-pain-clinic-physician-barred-from-resumingpractice/article_5e51a1f2-81e8-5c39-81c1-886bf9853210.html.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
218. Jordyn Reiland, McHenry Doctor Has License Suspended After Federal Investigation Alleges He
Overprescribed Pain Medication, NORTHWEST HERALD (Mar. 15, 2017, 12:42 AM),
https://www.nwherald.com/2017/03/14/mchenry-doctor-has-license-suspended-after-federal-investigationalleges-he-overprescribed-pain-medication/ahlkjis/.
219. Id.
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both of them without conducting a thorough examination or taking x-rays.220
He also prescribed pain medications to 250 patients from out of state, which is
a warning sign of improper prescribing.221 There appears to be no record of
state or federal prosecution against him. 222
In 2017, the Oklahoma State Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision
requested a hearing on Dr. Jan Rosnow—a pediatric anesthesiologist who was
nevertheless collecting a salary in excess of $300,000 per year by working in
pain management and hospice medicine.223 The medical board alleged that Dr.
Rosnow allowed office staff to write prescriptions for her without examining
the patients.224 The medical board alleged a slew of additional violations,
including that Dr. Rosnow had written false or fictitious prescriptions for
narcotics and indiscriminate and excessive prescribing of narcotics.225 Rather
than contest the allegations, Dr. Rosnow conceded that she lacked the ability to
practice medicine and voluntarily surrendered her license.226 It does not appear
that prosecutors brought any criminal charges. 227
In New Jersey, the medical board agreed to a consent order with Dr.
Moishe Starkman in which he agreed to stop practicing medicine in exchange
for avoiding monetary fines.228 A twenty-two-year-old patient died after Dr.
Starkman “prescribed Xanax and up to 240 pain pills per month over a threeyear period without ever reassessing the man’s dosage.”229 In the initial
complaint seeking to revoke his license, the medical board noted that Dr.
Starkman “routinely prescribed hundreds of opioid pills to patients—even to
those who showed signs they may have been addicted to the drugs or were
diverting them for illegal use.”230 The medical board contended that Dr.
Starkman “gave one woman prescriptions to take one oxycodone pill every
hour for an entire month, or 720 pills total.”231
The acting director of the Consumer Affairs Division (an arm of the civil
side of the Attorney General’s Office) explained that “[i]f ever a case called for

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
223. Jan Marie Rosnow, M.D., Amended Verified Complaint Case No. 15-10-5226, at 2, 6 (Okla. State
Bd. of Med. Licensure and Supervision, May 30, 2017), https://secure.okmedicalboard.org/subscriber/
disc_pdfs/27462_2017_05_30_Jan_Rosnow_(2)_MD.pdf.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 5.
226. Jan Marie Rosnow, M.D., Voluntary Surrender of License in Lieu of Prosecution with Waiver of
Right to Reapply Case No. 15-10-5226 (Okla. State Bd. of Med. Licensure and Supervision, July 25, 2017),
https://secure.okmedicalboard.org/subscriber/disc_pdfs/27462_2017_07_24_Jan_Rosnow_MD.pdf.
227. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
228. Doctor Gives Up License After Opioid Allegations, CHERRY HILL COURIER-POST,
https://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/local/south-jersey/2018/04/17/opioid-doctor-moishe-starkmanbordentown-nj-loses-license/523395002/ (Apr. 20, 2018).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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a permanent license revocation, it’s this one.”232 The criminal side of the
Attorney General’s Office did not bring charges.233
In New Mexico, the medical board suspended (and eventually entered
into an agreed voluntary license surrender) the license of Dr. John Flores.234
The board alleged that over a one-year period he wrote prescriptions for more
than 500,000 oxycodone pills.235 Although located in Silver City, New Mexico
(far from the borders of Arizona and Texas), he wrote prescriptions for patients
in nine states that were filled in over 100 pharmacies.236 In 2015, four of his
patients who were prescribed large quantities of controlled substances died.237
Neither state nor federal prosecutors appear to have brought criminal charges
for controlled substances violations.238
Perhaps most emblematic of the failure to prosecute doctors for opioid
drug distribution is the case of Dr. John Carl Ferrell, who practiced family
medicine in Frisco, Texas, near Dallas.239 On New Year’s Day of 2018, police
responded to a domestic disturbance call and found Dr. Ferrell and “a female
patient who was partially undressed and incoherent.”240 Police also found 3.15
grams of cocaine and 1.5 grams of ecstasy and Dr. Ferrell claimed ownership
of the drugs.241 Nine months later, the Texas Medical Board suspended Dr.
Ferrell’s license.242 The medical board focused in part on his arrest for the
cocaine and ecstasy but gave considerably more attention to his misprescribing
of opioids.243 The board noted that although Dr. Ferrell was a family physician,
he was effectively operating an unlicensed pain management clinic.244 In a

232. Id.
233. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
234. John A. Flores, M.D., Stipulation and Order for Voluntary Surrender of License Case No. 2016-020
(N.M. Med. Bd., May 22, 2017), http://docfinder.docboard.org/nm_orders/Flores,%20John%20A.pdf.
235. John A. Flores, M.D., Notice of Summary Suspension Case No. 2016-020, at 1 (N.M. Med. Bd., May
12, 2016), http://docfinder.docboard.org/nm_orders/Flores,%20John%20A.pdf.
236. Id. at 2.
237. Id.
238. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
239. See John Carl Ferrell, M.D., Order of Temporary Suspension (Tex. Med. Bd., Sept. 14, 2018),
https://profile.tmb.state.tx.us/Search.aspx?bbaa736e-7a25-40a6-b447-a080ef4f09d5 (type “Ferrell” in “Last
Name” search bar and “Carl” in “First Name” search bar and click “Search”; then click “Ferrell, John Carl”
hyperlink; then choose “Current Board Action”; then click “Complete Board Action History” hyperlink; then
choose “Web Documents”; then click “9/14/2018” hyperlink).
240. Valerie Wigglesworth, Frisco Doctor Suspended Over ‘Continuing Threat’ After Drug Arrest, High
Number of Opioid Prescriptions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:37 PM),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2018/09/18/frisco-doctor-suspended-over-continuing-threat-afterdrug-arrest-high-number-of-opioid-prescriptions/.
241. Id.
242. Id. A few months later, Dr. Ferrell agreed to permanently surrender his license rather than contest the
disciplinary process. John Carl Ferrell, M.D., Agreed Order of Voluntary Surrender (Tex. Med. Bd., Dec. 7,
2018), https://profile.tmb.state.tx.us/Search.aspx?bbaa736e-7a25-40a6-b447-a080ef4f09d5 (type “Ferrell” in
“Last Name” search bar and “Carl” in “First Name” search bar and click “Search”; then click “Ferrell, John
Carl” hyperlink; then choose “Current Board Action”; then click “12/7/2018” hyperlink).
243. See John Carl Ferrell, M.D., supra note 239.
244. See id. at 3.
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one-year period, Dr. Ferrell wrote 4,891 prescriptions for controlled
substances, of which 92% were opioids.245 Assuming 250 working days a year,
that amounts to roughly eighteen opioid prescriptions per day being issued by a
family physician. In an indication of drug-seeking behavior, patients were
allegedly coming to see Dr. Ferrell from as far away as Oklahoma and
Louisiana.246 The board noted that “patients were coming to see [Dr. Ferrell]
for the purpose of obtaining prescriptions for controlled substances from cities
and towns located hundreds of miles from Frisco, Texas.”247 Based on the
cocaine found during the domestic dispute, local prosecutors charged Dr.
Ferrell with possession of a controlled substance.248 Neither state nor federal
prosecutors brought charges for the opioid distribution however.249
***
The more than two dozen cases described above are not the worst of the
worst from the opioid crisis. Other physicians ran pill mills that distributed far
greater numbers of pills and served hundreds of obviously addicted
individuals.250 Other doctors engaged in crystal clear transactions in which
they sold opioids for cash as if they were operating a convenience store.251
While the cases highlighted above are surely not as egregious as the worst
offenders, neither can we deny that some of them involved drug dealing. In
many of the cases described above, doctors clearly handed out prescriptions for
dangerous, addictive drugs for which there was no legitimate medical purpose.

IV. LESS AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTIONS AGAINST DOCTORS
Over the last few years, prosecutors have brought many criminal cases
against doctors. Some, as noted above, are aggressive prosecutions in which
245. Id. at 2.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3.
248. Wigglesworth, supra note 240.
249. A search of federal and state criminal court dockets did not turn up criminal charges.
Another category of misconduct is doctors improperly prescribing drugs to family. Some of these cases have
arisen in the opioid epidemic and not resulted in prosecution. For instance, the Alabama medical board
temporarily suspended the license of Dr. Barry Lumpkins for, inter alia, prescribing controlled substances to
his girlfriend and close family members. See Al Whitaker, Shoals Doctor Has Medical License Suspended;
State Board Says He Tested Positive for Oxycodone, Kept ‘Home Stock’ of Demerol, WHNT NEWS 19 (Jan.
24, 2017), https://whnt.com/2017/01/24/shoals-doctor-has-medical-license-suspended-state-board-says-hetested-positive-for-oxycodone-kept-home-stock-of-demerol/. The Pennsylvania medical board suspended the
medical license of Dr. Daljit Singh because he prescribed numerous drugs including the opioid hydrocodone to
a nurse he worked with and began dating. Dr. Singh also prescribed drugs to his girlfriend’s daughter. See
Theresa Clift, Board Cites Prescriptions for Girlfriend in Suspending Pittsburgh Doctor, TRIB LIVE (Aug. 1,
2017,
5:33
PM),
https://archive.triblive.com/news/pittsburgh-allegheny/board-cites-prescriptions-forgirlfriend-in-suspending-pittsburgh-doctor/.
250. See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, 12 Million Pills and 700 Deaths: How a Few Pill Mills Helped Fan the
U.S. Opioid Inferno, L.A. TIMES (June 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-pillmills-linked-to-hundreds-of-deaths-20190614-story.html.
251. See, e.g., Terry Spencer, Florida ‘Pill Mills’ Were ‘Gas on the Fire’ of Opioid Crisis, ASSOC. PRESS
(July 20, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/0ced46b203864d8fa6b8fda6bd97b60e (discussing on-site
pharmacies at pill mills that sold oxycodone at $10 per pill).
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prosecutors threw the book at the doctors. In these cases, prosecutors brought
numerous counts of distributing controlled substances and sought stiff
sentences.252 Other prosecutions are much less aggressive. As described below
in Part IV.A, prosecutors have secured guilty pleas for drug distribution but
agreed to plea bargains with light sentences. In other instances, as detailed in
Part IV.B, prosecutors have taken the easier avenue of allowing defendants to
plead to white-collar charges such as forgery, health care fraud, structuring,
and tax crimes, rather than pressing forward and pursuing more serious drug
distribution charges.
A. CONVICTIONS (BUT LIGHT PUNISHMENTS) FOR DEALING CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES
In the more egregious cases, prosecutors have brought charges against
doctors for controlled substances violations. Even when the facts have been
egregious and juries have convicted though, that does not mean there were
lengthy sentences. In some cases, the punishments seem quite light and grossly
out of line with the sentences for defendants peddling equally dangerous drugs
on the street.
For instance, in Kokomo, Indiana, it was well known that the Waggoner
Medical Clinic—owned by Dr. Donald and Dr. Marilyn Waggoner—was the
place to go for opioids.253 According to a prosecutor, “[i]f you wanted pills,
you went to Waggoners. It was common knowledge.”254 Investigators found
that many patients were receiving opioid prescriptions that were larger than
necessary, and that twenty-seven patients linked to the clinic died from
drugs.255 Prosecutors brought a slew of charges—including controlled
substances dealing charges—against four doctors and three physician
assistants.256 While multiple defendants were convicted, only Dr. Donald
Waggoner received a prison sentence.257 His sentence was only two years, and
“[w]ith good time credit, the sentence amounted to a year in prison, but he was
released with less than a year served.”258
In Illinois, prosecutors brought charges of Medicare fraud and illegally
prescribing controlled substances, including oxycodone, against Dr. Sathish

252. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., W. Dist. of Va., Virginia Doctor Convicted on 861 Federal
Counts of Drug Distribution, Including Distribution Resulting in Death: Faces Mandatory Minimum of 20
Years in Prison (May 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/virginia-doctor-convicted-861-federalcounts-drug-distribution-including-distribution.
253. See Devin Zimmerman, Wagoner Case Closes, KOKOMO PERSP. (June 20, 2017),
http://kokomoperspective.com/kp/news/wagoner-case-closes/article_81bb272e-552f-11e7-b6484fefb5c9dcf4.html.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Other defendants received probation or house-arrest. Id.
258. Id.
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Narayanappa Babu.259 Dr. Babu did not actually see or examine patients and
instead permitted staff to fill out prescriptions and order refills.260 He was
sentenced to eighteen months.261
In New Jersey, Dr. Alan Faustino—who had treated celebrities such as
Billy Idol and Paula Abdul—pleaded guilty to distributing controlled
substances.262 In exchange for $300, he would write an opioid prescription
without conducting a physical examination.263 According to prosecutors, he
“led a drug ring that put more than 1,200 pills on the street each day.”264 Under
a plea deal, Dr. Faustino received a sentence of only four years and he was
paroled after serving less than seven months.265 Notably, the sentencing judge
could have imposed a sentence of up to ten years but decided to hand down the
lighter four-year sentence because Dr. Faustino would lose his medical
license.266
B. ALLOWING DOCTORS TO PLEAD GUILTY TO WHITE COLLAR CRIMES IN
LIEU OF DRUG DEALING CHARGES
In some cases, doctors lost their medical licenses and were convicted of
serious crimes, but prosecutors dropped the controlled substances charges. For
instance, consider the case of Dr. Paul DiLorenzo who wrote prescriptions for
massive amounts of oxycodone and collected more than $2 million cash
payments from his patients.267 The New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners
alleged that Dr. DiLorenzo “demanded cash from his patients”268 and that he
would “charge people $500 for an initial visit and $300 for follow-up visits,
giving them 240 tablets of oxycodone each time without a medical
examination.”269 On at least thirty-five occasions, he allegedly received more
than $10,000 per day in cash from patients.270 Prosecutors initially brought
259. See Geoff Ziezulewicz, Bolingbrook Doctor Gets 18 Months in Prison, CHI. TRIB. (Feb 24, 2015,
6:19 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/ct-bol-physician-drug-sentencing-tl-0305-20150224story.html.
260. See id.
261. Id.
262. Molly Bilinski, Atlantic County ‘Doctor to the Stars’ Sentenced to 4 Years for Drug Trafficking,
PRESS OF ATL. CITY (July 5, 2018), https://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/crime/atlantic-county-doctor-tothe-stars-sentenced-to-years-for/article_93f7d7fb-e7c3-5970-8fbc-bca9c0c26ca0.html.
263. See Lynda Cohen, Abescon Doctor Who Led Drug Ring Free After Seven Months, BREAKINGAC
(Feb. 14, 2019, 8:11 PM), https://www.breakingac.com/2019/02/absecon-doctor-who-led-drug-ring-free/.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Bilinski, supra note 262.
267. See Andrew Ford, Ocean Doctor Dodges Drug Rap, Imprisoned on Taxes, ASHBURY PARK PRESS
(Mar. 8, 2015, 10:14 AM), https://www.app.com/story/news/crime/jersey-mayhem/2015/03/08/ocean-doctordodges-drug-rap-imprisoned-taxes/24604759/.
268. Id.
269. Susan K. Livio, N.J. Revokes License of Doctor Called “Major Contributor to Opiate Abuse Crisis”,
NJ.COM, https://www.nj.com/healthfit/2015/03/nj_revokes_license_of_doctor_called_major_contribu.html
(Mar. 29, 2019).
270. Ford, supra note 267.
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drug distribution charges for violating the Controlled Substances Act but
ultimately agreed to let him plead guilty to the crime of structuring.271 He was
sentenced to forty-six months on the white-collar charges, rather than the much
more severe penalties associated with drug distribution charges.272
Similarly, in Maryland, prosecutors originally indicted Dr. Kofi ShawTaylor—a urologist—on hundreds of counts of drug dealing for his role in a
pill mill.273 Prosecutors alleged that patients were paying upwards of $500 for
an office visit and receiving opioid prescriptions in exchange.274 Two patients
allegedly died as a result of prescriptions from Dr. Shaw-Taylor and he
originally faced two life sentences.275 Prosecutors, however, did not hold firm
on the drug distribution charges. They agreed to a guilty plea on Medicaid
fraud charges and Dr. Shaw-Taylor received two concurrent five-year
sentences.276 After deducting pre-trial detention when he was under housearrest, his sentence will amount to less than four years.277
Over a four-year period, Dr. Mihir Bhatt prescribed more than 1.8 million
oxycodone pills to longshoremen in Brooklyn and Staten Island, New York.278
He wrote nearly 12,000 prescriptions in two years and netted more than $12
million in proceeds.279 Dr. Bhatt would dispense pills from his home in New
Jersey, while claiming to have examined the patients in his New York
office.280 According to the DEA,
Patients paid for the alleged pain management services by using their
insurance and received prescriptions for oxycodone based upon perfunctory
or nonexistent treatment rendered by Bhatt . . . .
....

271. See id. Structuring is the act of breaking financial transactions into smaller parts in order to evade
bank reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
272. See Ford, supra note 267.
273. See Tim Prudente, Two Maryland Doctors Indicted on Drug Charges After Allegedly Writing
Prescriptions for More than a Quarter-Million Doses, BALT. SUN (Aug. 10, 2017, 12:35 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-doctors-indicted-20170810-story.html.
274. Indictment at 4, State v. Shaw-Taylor, No. 17-7002-00078-1 (Md. Cir. Ct., Aug. 4, 2017),
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/news%20documents/SHAW_TAYLOR_Indictment.pdf.
275. See Prudente, supra note 273.
276. See Joshua Stewart, Doctor in Painkiller ‘Pill Mill’ Case Sentenced to Five Years, CAP. GAZETTE
(Aug. 3, 2018, 10:25 AM), https://www.capitalgazette.com/news/crime/ac-cn-shaw-opioid-sentencing-0803story.html.
277. See id.
278. Frank Donnelly, Doctor Who ‘Helped Fuel’ Borough Drug Crisis Sentenced in Pill-Mill Scheme,
SILIVE.COM, https://www.silive.com/news/2017/04/doctor_who_helped_fuel_borough.html (Apr. 7, 2017).
279. See Press Release, Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Medical Professionals Performed
Perfunctory Exams on Longshoremen and Filled Scripts for Narcotics in Elaborate Scheme to Rip Off
Insurance Companies (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2013/12/18/medical-professionalsperformed-perfunctory-exams-longshoremen-and-filled.
280. See Donnelly, supra note 278.
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Participating patients would call to get prescriptions for oxycodone and
would receive them in return for billable office visits that did not occur, or
which were perfunctory and lasted only an average 3–5 minutes.281

Dr. Bhatt was convicted for his role in the opioid prescribing scheme—
but not for distributing controlled substances.282 Prosecutors agreed to let him
plead guilty to insurance fraud and he received a sentence of six months in jail
and five years of probation.283
Indiana prosecutors brought charges against Dr. William Hedrick for
forgery and registration violations.284 The charges were based on Dr. Hedrick
and his staff using the prescription pads and registration numbers of other
people to prescribe narcotics.285 The DEA became aware of misconduct at Dr.
Hedrick’s practice after:
[P]harmacies informed the DEA that the total volume of “controlled
substance prescriptions being prescribed out of [Hedrick’s] . . . medical
practice” was alarming. The pharmacies indicated that Hedrick’s clinic was
prescribing “dangerous combinations of controlled substances,” i.e.,
“narcotics . . . with anti-depressant.” Some other pharmacies had altogether
stopped filling prescriptions from Hedrick and his practice.286

The over-prescribing at Dr. Hedrick’s practice allegedly led to the death
of eight patients.287 Yet, it does not appear that prosecutors brought charges for
drug dealing. They charged him only with the less serious white-collar crimes
of forgery and registration violations.288
In Michigan, prosecutors charged Dr. Steven Owen for Medicaid fraud
after he allegedly prescribed opioids to undercover investigators who did not
complain of pain.289 One of the investigators apparently told Dr. Owen that she
wanted the drugs because she “liked to ‘party and drink alcohol’ with her
medication.”290 Dr. Owen allegedly responded “Oh, God, yeah man” and wrote
the prescription.291 An expert who reviewed a patient file concluded that Dr.
Owen did not try to determine the cause of the patient’s pain and instead

281. Press Release, supra note 279.
282. See Donnelly, supra note 278.
283. See id.
284. See Hedrick v. State, 124 N.E.3d 1273, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
285. See id. at 1276–77.
286. Id. at 1277 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
287. Assoc. Press, Pain Doctor’s Sentence Upheld in Prescription Case, WWTV: CBS 4 (June 4, 2019,
7:58 AM), https://cbs4indy.com/news/pain-doctors-sentence-upheld-in-prescription-case.
288. See Hedrick, 124 N.E.3d at 1278.
289. See Ken Palmer, Mason Doctor Faces Fraud Charges After Investigation Involving Opioids,
LANSING ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2019/04/09/masondoctor-faces-fraud-charges-after-investigation-involving-opioids/3412461002/.
290. Ken Palmer, State Suspends License of Mason Doctor for Over Prescribing Opioids, Other
Controlled Substances, LANSING ST. J., https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2019/03/04/
state-suspends-license-mason-doctor-over-prescribing-opioids/3058230002/ (Mar. 5, 2019).
291. Id.
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“fabricated diagnoses to justify prescribing controlled substances.”292 While
Medicaid fraud charges are serious and carry prison time, the possible
punishment is far less than the possible punishment for distributing a
controlled substance.293
***
The light punishment cases discussed in Part IV.A and the lesser whitecollar offense cases in Part IV.B are surely not an exhaustive list. If local
media fails to capture a criminal prosecution—especially a guilty plea in which
the defendant waived his appeals—it is incredibly difficult to unearth the case.
As such, the prosecutions discussed above are likely just a subset of a much
larger group of cases in which prosecutors agreed to light sentences for opioid
drug distribution or forewent the drug distribution charges altogether.

V. REASONS WHY PROSECUTORS HAVE BEEN LESS AGGRESSIVE IN
CHARGING DOCTORS WITH DRUG DISTRIBUTION
Prosecutors have certainly not shirked their duties when it comes to
bringing charges against the most egregious pill mill doctors. As discussed
above, prosecutors have brought drug distribution charges against the worst of
the worst offenders. Failing to do so would be politically unwise for local
elected prosecutors and embarrassing for federal prosecutors.294 This Article
maintains, however, that both federal and state prosecutors have not been
aggressive about bringing opioid distribution charges against doctors who
occupy the next rung down in the chain—doctors who were engaged in less
egregious but still arguable criminal misconduct. When doctors lost their
licenses for knowingly misprescribing opioids (albeit not at the level of a pill
mill), prosecutors have sometimes given a pass on criminal charges. There are
many possible reasons why prosecutors have declined to bring charges. This
Part discusses the legal, resource, litigation, and psychological challenges that
lead to under-prosecution.
First, there are particular characteristics of physician defendants that
make them harder to prosecute. On average, doctors are wealthier than most
criminal defendants.295 This means they can retain talented defense attorneys
and fund the litigation maneuvering that retained lawyers bring to the table.
Although drug distribution cases are not traditional white-collar cases, they
nevertheless are more complex and paper-intensive than street drug deal
292. Id.
293. In the federal system, conviction for a single count of distributing a schedule I or II controlled
substance carries a sentence of up to twenty years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(c).
294. Professors Dan Richman and Bill Stuntz recognized that certain crimes are “politically mandatory”
and simply must be prosecuted because they are important to voters. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz,
Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 583, 600 (2005).
295. See Courtney Connley, The 25 Highest-Paying Jobs in America, CNBC (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/16/the-25-highest-paying-jobs-in-america.html (listing physician as the
highest paid profession with a median salary of about $195,000).
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cases.296 Engaged and highly competent attorneys can file motions, retain
experts, and use a host of other tactics that make it harder for prosecutors to
win. Prosecutors—particularly overburdened state prosecutors297—may thus
turn their attention to other defendants who would be easier to convict.298
In addition to their wealth, doctors as a class may be more difficult to
convict in the courtroom because of their high-prestige status. Americans rank
the job of physician as the highest prestige job in the United States.299 Not
surprisingly, in the civil context, physicians are likely to win medical
malpractice lawsuits.300 Prosecutors can, of course, “flip the script” and tell a
jury that the physician defendant has abused his vaulted position as a trusted
healer. But talented defense lawyers will have the opportunity to convince the
jury of all the schooling and hard work a doctor undertook so that he could
spend years helping the community. And if a physician was doing more than
simply running a pill mill, he will be able to point to patients whose lives he
materially improved. The defense can present the testimony of some patients
who were suffering tremendous pain and who benefitted from the opioids
prescribed by the doctor. The defense may even be able to identify patients
whose lives were saved by the doctor.
The fact that doctors are well-resourced and can tell positive stories about
the patients they helped obviously would not preclude prosecutors from
bringing drug distribution charges. But, at the margins, these factors make
prosecutions less likely.
A second reason that may deter prosecutors from bringing opioid
distribution charges against doctors is the recent American understanding of
pain as the fifth vital sign. In the 1990s, some doctors as well as the American
Pain Society began to push the idea that pain should be treated with the same
attention as the four basic vital signs: pulse rate, temperature, respiration rate,
and blood pressure.301 By 2001, the Joint Commission, a not-for-profit entity
that accredits more than 20,000 health care organizations, insisted that doctors

296. Observers have long recognized that prosecutors bring fewer white-collar cases because they are
resource intensive. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Pinto, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal
Prosecutions, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1343, 1363–64 (1999).
297. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2011).
298. See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925, 968 (2018) (“When a
government prosecutor can rack up easier statistics with crimes of perjury, mail fraud, or obstruction of justice,
it is difficult to imagine him or her spending significant time investigating and analyzing such computerrelated conduct. . . . The shortcut crimes will certainly be easier to pursue . . . .”).
299. See, e.g., Jacquelyn Smith, The 10 Most Prestigious Jobs in America, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2014),
https://www.businessinsider.in/The-10-Most-Prestigious-Jobs-In-America/articleshow/45141171.cms.
300. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Twenty Years of Evidence on the Outcomes of Malpractice Claims, 467
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RSCH. 352, 352 (2009) (“Physicians win 80% to 90% of the jury trials
with weak evidence of medical negligence, approximately 70% of the borderline cases, and even 50% of the
trials in cases with strong evidence of medical negligence.”).
301. See Ben A. Rich, The Politics of Pain: Rhetoric or Reform?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 519, 537–
38 (2005).
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conduct detailed assessments of pain for each patient.302 Because governmental
bodies require Joint Commission accreditation to receive Medicare
reimbursement, hospitals and other health care organizations also adopted the
idea of pain as a fifth vital sign.303 In short order, the concept slipped into the
American consciousness. Now, in almost every hospital room (as well as some
doctor’s offices) people are accustomed to seeing pain scales with smiling and
scowling faces on the wall.304
The development of pain as the fifth vital sign likely bears some
responsibility for the opioid crisis.305 And it may contribute to the difficulty of
prosecuting doctors. Americans have grown accustomed to the idea that
patients should have their pain immediately remedied. Prosecutors thus surely
know that doctors who are accused of over-prescribing will respond with an
emotional appeal that will resonate with jurors—they were only trying to
decrease the type of suffering that Americans have grown accustomed to
having treated. Put simply, in a world where pain management is as important
to patients as heart rate and blood pressure, it is more difficult to put doctors on
trial for prescribing too much pain medication.
A third factor that may make prosecutors reluctant to bring opioid drug
dealing charges is the availability of medical board discipline.306 Revoking a
medical license serves incapacitative, retributive, and general deterrence
purposes. Doctors who over-prescribe drugs are dangerous because they are
licensed to practice medicine and can distribute controlled substances to
patients. If those doctors’ licenses are revoked, the doctors are no longer
dangerous to the community—they are incapacitated by the administrative
revocation of their licenses.
Further, prosecutors may conclude that losing a license is retributive
because the doctors are losing their livelihood. Physicians are well-paid and, as
noted above, their profession carries enormous prestige. When medical boards
revoke physicians’ licenses, the doctors will suffer, even if they are not
incarcerated. Indeed, prosecutors likely recognize that it is rare for doctors to
lose their licenses, so that may even increase the feeling that the doctor has
302. Benjamin Pomerance, Yet Another War: Battling for Reasoned Responses for Veterans Amid the
Opioid Crisis, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 147, 151 (2017).
303. Id. at 152.
304. See
e.g.,
Using
the
Pain
Scale,
SPECIALISTS
HOSP.
SHREVEPORT,
https://specialistshospitalshreveport.com/patient-resources/using-the-pain-scale/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
305. See Troy Brown, New Attitudes Toward Pain Amid the Opioid Crisis, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/893926; Teresa A. Rummans, Caroline Burton & Nancy L. Dawson,
How Good Intentions Contributed to Bad Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 344, 344
(2018).
306. As two experts have remarked, “[m]any prosecutors have been willing to rely on [state medical
boards] to determine appropriate physician behavior.” Dineen & DuBois, supra note 10, at 36; accord Stephen
J. Ziegler & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey
of Chief Prosecutors, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 75, 90–91 (2003) (surveying state prosecutors and finding, albeit
before the opioid crisis that in the case of over-prescribing opioids most would refer the matter to the state
medical board rather than pursue a criminal investigation).
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already been severely punished. Additionally, some (though certainly not all)
prosecutors might factor in the subjective experience of punishment when
thinking about the significance of losing a medical license.307 Many doctors
have grown accustomed to wealth and prestige, and taking away that success
may hit them harder than other “non-elite” individuals who lose access to a
particular profession.
Additionally, when a medical board revokes a doctor’s license,
prosecutors might see it as serving the same general deterrence function that
we normally turn to the criminal law for. License revocations often result in
media stories,308 which are surely widely distributed in the medical
community. Medical board decisions to revoke licenses may thus deter other
doctors from over-prescribing opioids in the same way that convictions and
incarceration would.
A fourth disincentive to prosecutors bringing drug distribution charges
against opioid prescribers is the availability of other, easier-to-prove
charges.309 Prosecutors sometimes forego drug distribution charges and instead
charge health care fraud and related offenses.310 As detailed in Part II,
prosecutors can bring federal controlled substances charges against a licensed
physician when he writes a prescription without a “legitimate medical
purpose . . . in the usual course of his professional practice.” This standard is
not clear.311 A defendant caught red-handed dealing cocaine will have a hard
time convincing a jury to acquit him. By contrast, a doctor prescribing opioids
can argue that (1) there was a legitimate medical purpose for the prescriptions;
and (2) even if there were no such purpose that the doctor believed there was
such a purpose.
On the first point, the doctor can take the witness stand and explain to the
jury about his experience treating pain and how opioids serve a legitimate
purpose. In lieu of testifying (or in addition to testifying), the doctor can hire
an expert witness to make the same argument.
On the second point, the doctor can make a scienter argument that he
lacked the knowledge mens rea in the controlled substances statute because he
did not know the prescription was unauthorized or that he did not realize that it
was for an illegitimate medical purpose.312 Courts also have interpreted the
statute to afford doctors a good faith exception.313
307. See generally Adam J. Kolber, Essay, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182 (2009) (explaining United States’ sentencing practices and arguing that the subjective experience of
punishment should be factored into sentencing).
308. See, e.g., supra Part III.
309. See Podgor, supra note 298, at 967 (explaining how prosecutors are drawn to easier-to-prove charges
in white collar cases).
310. See supra Part IV.A.
311. See Hellman, supra note 82, at 707.
312. See id. at 713 (“Though they rarely address this question directly, most courts seem to require the
prosecutor to show that the defendant knew something beyond merely the fact that he was dispensing a
controlled substance.”). Surprisingly, the question of what the mens rea of “knowledge” modifies is unsettled.
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As Professor Deborah Hellman and other scholars have observed, the
ambiguity of the criminal statute when applied to doctors creates the risk that
doctors will be prosecuted unfairly for conduct that was not clearly indicated in
advance to be illegal.314 On the other hand, however, the ambiguity may serve
to make it difficult for a prosecutor to tell a jury exactly what a doctor has done
wrong. The term “legitimate medical purpose” could be broadly interpreted by
jurors to focus on the good things a doctor has done for a patient or a group of
patients, while minimizing the doctor’s misconduct. Unlike street dealers, who
cannot point to legitimate activity when they dispense illegal drugs, doctors
can point to some cases in which opioid prescriptions served a legitimate
medical purpose. These legitimate acts for some patients may distract jurors
from other cases in which there was no legitimate medical purpose to give a
patient the type or quantity of opioids prescribed. In short, it is likely
somewhat difficult to convince a jury that a defendant should be found guilty
for prescribing drugs with no legitimate medical purpose when a visible part of
the doctor’s practice did involve legitimate medical activity. When we add that
prosecutors will have to win a “battle of the experts,” prosecutors may simply
conclude that it is easier to bring other criminal charges—such as health care
fraud, structuring, or tax evasion—for which the elements are clearer and the
existence of a paper trail makes it easier to prove.
***
There are a number of reasons—including doctors’ prestige and
resources, the development of pain as the fifth vital sign, the availability of
easier-to-prove charges, and a vague statutory scheme that can be interpreted
in an overly generous fashion—that make it less likely for doctors to be
prosecuted for improperly distributing opioids.315 The next question is how
legislatures should deal with the under-prosecution problem.

As Professor Hellman explains, “Some courts find that the mens rea requirement of ‘knowingly or
intentionally’ for the ‘distributing’ and ‘controlled substance’ elements also applies to the fact that distribution
in that context is unauthorized. Alternatively, other courts read the mens rea requirement into their
interpretation of what constitutes a ‘legitimate medical purpose.’” Id. (footnote omitted).
313. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 476 (4th Cir. 2006).
314. See Hellman, supra note 82, at 715.
315. One final reason—an explanation that is hard to prove—could also be at play in limiting doctor
prosecutions. It is possible that there is a norm that doctors who voluntarily surrender their licenses during the
medical board disciplinary process will be less likely to face criminal charges. It is possible that prosecutors’
offices give signals—and in turn that medical boards reiterate these signals to physicians—that voluntary
license surrenders will be looked upon favorably by prosecutors in making charging decisions. This
explanation intuitively makes sense given the large number of voluntary license surrenders. For instance, a
study of physicians disciplined in California found 375 disciplined and another 73 doctors who voluntarily
surrendered their licenses. James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplined by a State Medical
Board, 279 JAMA 1889, 1890 (1998). On the other hand, there may be other factors that explain the voluntary
surrenders. For instance, doctors might surrender their licenses rather than deal with the cost or potentially
damaging admissions involved in a disciplinary proceeding.
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VI. LEGISLATURES SHOULD BETTER FUND STATE MEDICAL BOARDS,
FEDERAL AND STATE PROSECUTORS, AND MEDICAL EXPERTS
The under-prosecution of doctors in the opioid crisis raises the question
of what actions legislatures can take to ensure dangerous physicians are
criminally prosecuted. This Part explores two solutions—one wise and the
other less so—that legislatures could embrace to punish over-prescribing
doctors.
A. AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION TO EXPAND THE STATUTE
This Article has taken the view that some doctors have improperly
escaped criminal liability for their role in the opioid crisis. It is therefore
tempting to suggest that federal and state legislatures broaden their criminal
statutes, perhaps by lowering the mens rea or expanding the liability standard.
That temptation is dangerous however. Criminal justice scholars have long
criticized how legislatures have given prosecutors vast power by creating too
many criminal statutes and by drafting statutes that are too broad.316 A large
menu of charges and broad statutes gives prosecutors tremendous power.317
Scholars have also criticized how prosecutors have wielded that power in some
cases in an overly aggressive fashion to lock up too many people.318 Broader
laws to prosecute doctors—even for outrageous opioid prescribing—would
raise the same concerns about excessive prosecutorial power and over-reaching
prosecutions.
Moreover, broader criminal liability runs the risk of over-deterring lawabiding doctors. We already know that some doctors are reluctant to prescribe
pain medication out of fear of civil and criminal liability.319 Moreover, social
science research tells us that law-abiding individuals are less likely to engage
in risky behavior.320 A more expansive criminal liability standard may
therefore cause some doctors who should be willing to prescribe legitimate
pain medicine to be over-deterred. That could yield the tragic result of patients
who are in tremendous pain being unable to find physicians to help them. In
turn, individuals in chronic pain may be pushed onto the streets to acquire

316. Most famously, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505 (2001). Academics have paid less attention to the under-enforcement of criminal law. For a notable
exception, see Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006).
317. See Stuntz, supra note 316, at 519. My colleague Jeff Bellin has recently challenged this view,
arguing that academics have failed to appreciate the power of legislators and police. See Jeffrey Bellin, The
Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019).
318. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
319. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
320. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2509
(2004).
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heroin.321 Put simply, it is important not to put doctors in a position that will
cause them to over-correct.322
Finally, it does not appear that the statutory language of the Controlled
Substances Act is the primary obstacle hindering prosecution. In a number of
cases described in Parts III and IV above, it seems quite possible to
demonstrate that the doctors were prescribing opioids without a legitimate
medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice. When
doctors are writing prescriptions without conducting examinations, exchanging
sex for prescriptions, or distributing opioids designed for cancer patients to
other types of patients while taking money from the drug manufacturers, it
would seem possible for prosecutors to satisfy the statutory obligation of
proving the doctors were knowingly acting without a legitimate medical
purpose.
Something other than the statutory language is likely the primary obstacle
preventing prosecutors from bringing criminal cases. Thus, rather than
changing the statutory language, it may be more fruitful to approach the
problem by empowering the medical boards and prosecutors who we ask to
ferret out the improper prescribing.
B. TARGETED RESOURCES FOR STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND
PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES
The best way for legislatures to remedy the under-prosecution problem is
to enhance resources for both state medical boards and local prosecutors.
Even though they are not criminal agencies, state medical boards can be a
crucial partner in the prosecution of misprescribing doctors. State medical
boards are empowered to open disciplinary cases at an early stage based on
referrals from patients and other doctors.323 State medical boards can conduct
an investigation by reviewing patient files, interviewing witnesses, and
consulting with medical experts. The factual findings of the board are then
preserved in written reports accompanying the orders suspending or revoking
the doctors’ licenses. In short, state medical boards gather the same type of
evidence that prosecutors must acquire to prove a doctor was prescribing
opioids without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the course of
professional practice. And because most prosecutors’ offices have extremely
321. See Bowers & Abrahamson, supra note 7, at 807 (noting that “current enforcement efforts have
succeeded only in minimizing prescription drug use and the diversion of prescription drugs into illicit markets”
and that “prescription drug users have been redirected into those same markets”); Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions
Matter: A Taxonomy of Inappropriate Prescribing to Shape Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm,
67 U. KAN. L. REV. 961, 974–76 (2019); see also QUINONES, supra note 6 (detailing the history of America’s
opioid epidemic).
322. See Dineen, supra note 321, at 990. This is not to say that the current statutory framework is without
problems. As Professor Deborah Hellman and others have observed, the ambiguity of the mens rea portion of
the statutory scheme is so vague that it allows prosecutors to bring criminal charges in cases where doctors
were naïve or fooled into trusting patients they should not have. See Hellman, supra note 82, at 715–33.
323. See supra Part I.
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limited resources to hire medical experts, the state medical boards could
simultaneously be providing a roadmap for prosecutors to use in subsequently
bringing criminal charges.324
Unfortunately, state medical boards are under-staffed and over-worked.
Because they receive thousands of referrals each year, staff members must
juggle large caseloads. 325 Some cases are therefore not adequately investigated
and the factual record against bad doctors is not developed as robustly as it
could be. A study of criminal prosecutions of doctors (albeit from before the
opioid crisis) found that the vast majority of criminal convictions occurred
before medical boards made a final judgment.326 If state medical boards were
robustly ferreting out doctors engaged in misconduct, we would expect the
opposite turn of events—state medical board disciplinary action occurring first.
Instead, it appears that state medical boards are following prosecutors, rather
than leading them. Increased staffing of medical boards could therefore help
both in the discipline of doctors327 and also in laying a factual predicate that
could be later used in criminal prosecutions.
The same logic applies to the staffing of prosecutors’ offices. Despite
having enormous power in individual cases, many local prosecutors’ offices
are severely handicapped by excessive caseloads.328 Elected prosecutors are
under political pressure to devote most of their resources to violent crime and
street drug cases that the public has come to see as the bread-and-butter of state
prosecution.329 It is therefore not surprising that the average local prosecutor’s
office does not have a robust white-collar division.330 White-collar cases take
considerable time and resources that local prosecutors’ offices simply lack.331
And while distribution of a controlled substance is not typically thought of as a
white-collar charge, when it involves doctors who are running something short
of a pill mill, it takes on all the characteristics of a white-collar case.
Prosecutors have to mine patient files and other paper records and they must
piece together a case through multiple witnesses. And because doctors are
often affluent, prosecutors must deal with talented and well-resourced defense
attorneys. All of these factors make it less likely that prosecutors will pursue

324. See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 297, at 294.
325. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 45, at 22.
326. See Reidenberg & Willis, supra note 10, at 904 (noting that of 47 prosecutions studied, “[i]n only two
of these cases did a state medical board make a judgment before criminal action”).
327. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 45, at 55–56 (discussing benefits of staff increases).
328. See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 297.
329. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 294, at 601.
330. See id. at 601–02 (“[C]riminal litigation must be rationed not only based on political necessity but
also based on cost. . . . That is why high-end white-collar crime is (with a few rare exceptions) a federal
preserve; only the feds have the manpower to deal with the long, intricate paper trails, and only the feds can
afford to initiate and pursue major investigations without being certain that those investigations will turn up
evidence of serious crimes.” (footnote omitted)).
331. See id.
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drug dealing charges when the defendants are not the worst of the worst
offenders.
State legislatures should therefore provide additional funding not for
prosecutors’ offices in general but for specialty prosecutors who can handle
opioid prosecutions in particular. The idea of funding specialty prosecutors is
not new. State legislatures have regularly appropriated funds to hire
prosecutors to handle specific types of cases from drunk driving prosecutions
to elder abuse cases.332 States could take the same approach and fund opioid
prosecutors, particularly in counties that have been hardest hit by the opioid
epidemic.
There is an even bigger role for the federal government to play in funding
opioid prosecutors. Many opioid misprescribing cases are prosecuted by U.S.
Attorneys’ offices around the country.333 Those offices also have limited
resources and could bring more doctor prosecutions if they had the attorneys to
handle the cases. Accordingly, Congress could appropriate money specifically
for opioid prosecutions and target the funding to U.S. Attorneys’ offices
located in districts that have suffered the most in the opioid epidemic.
Federal funding for targeted federal prosecutions is also not a new
concept. For instance, after the success of Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia,
which moved state gun arrests to federal court to make them easier to
prosecute, Congress appropriated money to expand the program around the
country.334 Congress provided funding for 114 new prosecutors (and hundreds
of ATF agents) to specifically bring federal gun prosecutions.335
In addition to state funding for state opioid prosecutors and federal
funding for federal opioid prosecutors, we should look to Congress to provide
federal grant funding for state and local prosecutors. A model to follow is the
Violence Against Women Act, which has long provided federal grant funding
to hire state prosecutors to specifically handle domestic violence cases336 as

332. See, e.g., OR. DEP’T OF JUST., 2021–23 AGENCY REQUEST BUDGET: CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION 1
(2021), https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/21-23_doj_arb_criminal_justice_division.pdf;
Ellen Klem, How the Oregon Attorney General’s Office Tackles Elder Abuse, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN.
(May 31, 2018), https://www.naag.org/consumer-protection/attorney-general-journal/how-the-oregonattorney-generals-office-tackles-elder-abuse/.
333. See supra note 7.
334. See Daniel C. Richman,”Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority,
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 370–71 (2001).
335. See id. at 393 (discussing Act for Effective National Firearms Objectives for Responsible, CommonSense Enforcement of 2000, 106 H.R. 4066 (2000)).
336. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER &
SOC’Y 347, 386–87 (2008) (“Responding to deficits in prosecutorial services, Iowa used VAWA funding to
hire a special prosecutor. The prosecutor covered three counties, providing technical assistance to law
enforcement agencies and domestic violence advocates. Within a year, the counties served by the special
prosecutor had increased their conviction rates for domestic abuse cases to exceed the state average.” (footnote
omitted)); OFF. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP ’T OF JUST., 2016 BIENNIAL R EPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, at xi, 23–24
(2016), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/933886/download.
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well as to hire experts to train other prosecutors.337 Similarly, the Department
of Justice’s Project Safe Neighborhoods has provided more than $75 million in
funding to hire 600 state prosecutors to handle gun violence cases.338 Other
examples include local district attorneys using federal highway grant funds to
hire prosecutors to handle driving under the influence cases,339 and the use of
federal funds to hire local prosecutors specifically focused on community drug
prosecution.340 Following these prior successes, Congress could appropriate
federal grant funding to help states hire the staff necessary to prosecute doctors
(and other actors) responsible for the opioid crisis.
In providing resources, Congress and state legislatures should pay
particular attention not just to hiring prosecutors but also to the experts those
prosecutors will need to bring successful cases. In determining which doctors
should be disciplined, both medical boards and prosecutors’ offices need the
assistance of medical experts who can analyze prescribing practices and help
the prosecutors and medical boards figure out which cases to pursue. These
medical experts are very expensive, sometimes costing $500 or more per
hour.341 At present, because of these high costs and limited budgets,
prosecutors and medical boards are not able to retain medical experts as often
as they need. Grant funding for experts would thus be extremely valuable.
The idea of federal funding for doctor prosecutions should be feasible,
both practically and politically. On a practical level, the Justice Department has
already been actively funding state and local governments in an effort to stem
the opioid crisis. For instance, in October 2018, the Department announced
that it would make almost $320 million in grants to combat the opioid crisis.342
The following month, it allotted an additional $70 million.343 Although this
funding has been granted to worthy causes such as treatment programs,

337. See Symposium, Panel Three: The Impact of VAWA: Billions (Yes, with a B) for Prevention, Victim
Services, Law Enforcement, Underserved Populations and the Courts, and Looking Ahead to VAWA IV, 11
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 571, 586 (2010) (describing how a Michigan prosecutor was funded and helped to train
prosecutors and other actors in the criminal justice system).
338. Dana Slavin, Faith in Justice: Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, 48 FED. LAW., Oct. 2001, at 18,
24. Project Safe Neighborhoods also funded 100 federal prosecutors to prosecute illegal gun use. Id.
339. See Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North Carolina, 41 CRIME &
JUST. 211, 227 (2012).
340. See Ashley Lutheran, Possible Loss of Federal Grants Puts Milwaukee’s Popular Community
Prosecutor Program at Risk, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (July 10, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/
story/news/crime/2017/07/10/prosecutors-who-work-neighborhoods-risk-federal-grant-cuts/458946001.
341. See Victoria Negron, 2018 Expert Witness Fee Report: National Trends, EXPERT INST.,
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/2018-expert-witness-fee-report-national-trends/ (June 25,
2020) (providing national and state averages of costs for medical experts across specialties).
342. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Is Awarding Almost $320 Million to Combat
Opioid Crisis (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awarding-almost-320-millioncombat-opioid-crisis.
343. See John E. Wyand, M. Victoria Cram & Charles T. Brereton, Justice Department Allots Additional
US$70 Million to Battle Opioid Crisis, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
justice-department-allots-additional-us70-million-to-battle-opioid-crisis.
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improving prescription monitoring, and law enforcement training,344 it does not
appear that much, if any, of the funding has been earmarked for hiring
prosecutors and medical experts to pursue cases against the doctors who overprescribed the opioids.345
Providing additional funding to hire opioid prosecutors and retain medical
experts should not be an insurmountable political battle either. Solving the
opioid crisis (and preventing something similar from happening again) is one
of the few bipartisan issues in our otherwise divided politics. For instance, in
late 2018, both houses of Congress passed a bipartisan bill that contained law
enforcement and public health measures and which aimed to block deadly
fentanyl from being imported through the mail.346 To the extent that the two
political parties differ, it is over the amount of money to spend in attacking the
crisis. Democrats believe the crisis merits tens or even hundreds of billions of
dollars in federal funding, while Republicans have proposed less expensive
solutions.347 While Republicans will likely continue to be reluctant to agree to
massive federal funding, the Republican party is historically very supportive of
law enforcement, and thus, less likely to object to funding for prosecutors and
law enforcement initiatives. Moreover, in the grand scheme of funding to deal
with the opioid crisis, the amount of money needed to support prosecutors and
medical experts—likely in the tens of millions of dollars—is quite modest
compared to the billions of dollars being debated for treatment initiatives and
other costly programs. In short, federal funding to support the hiring of
prosecutors and medical experts should not be politically impossible.

CONCLUSION
Prosecutors have brought criminal charges against doctors for their role in
the opioid crisis. Some doctors have even faced serious charges, including drug
dealing, health care fraud, structuring, tax evasion, and even manslaughter and
murder. High-profile prosecutions of doctors who were running pill mills or
who were responsible for the deaths of multiple patients can leave a deceiving
impression however. A substantial portion of the public may believe that
prosecutors are aggressively pursuing all of the doctors who have
misprescribed opioids, in the same way that prosecutors aggressively charge
street dealers of heroin. And ethical doctors may be afraid that an aggressive
prosecution agenda could lead to them being unfairly prosecuted for
mistakenly prescribing opioids to patients who deceived them.
While prosecutors are bringing more drug distribution charges against
doctors, the full story about criminal prosecutions is more complicated than the
344. See Press Release, supra note 342.
345. See id.
346. Abby Goodnough, In Rare Bipartisan Accord, House and Senate Reach Compromise on Opioid Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/health/opioid-bill-congress.html.
347. See id.
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general public and the medical community likely realize. While prosecutors are
aggressively charging doctors who have engaged in the most egregious
behavior, there are many potentially criminal cases in which prosecutors have
declined to bring criminal charges. This Article documented more than two
dozen cases in which state medical boards revoked or suspended doctors’
licenses for improper opioid prescribing but for which neither federal nor state
prosecutors brought criminal charges. There are surely many more cases that
have evaded the public spotlight.
Given how rarely medical boards revoke doctors’ licenses for improper
prescribing, we should be concerned that many of these cases did not result in
criminal prosecutions. Prosecutors face an uphill battle in charging doctors
with drug dealing for prescribing drugs without a legitimate medical purpose
outside the course of professional practice. Doctors have prestige and the
money to hire excellent lawyers, making them more challenging to convict in a
courtroom. Prosecutors must also surmount the new American norm of pain
being treated as a fifth vital sign, which can be used to explain away
misprescribing. Faced with these obstacles, as well as considerable resource
constraints, the availability of less serious white-collar charges, and the option
of leaving discipline entirely to state medical boards, it is tempting for
prosecutors to forego charging doctors with distributing drugs without a
legitimate medical purpose.
Declining to prosecute drug distribution cases is problematic however.
Doctors who contributed to the opioid epidemic will escape punishment, while
street dealers of heroin (which is effectively the same drug as the opioids that
come in pill bottles) are rigorously prosecuted. That disparity harms the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Federal and state criminal codes
authorize prosecuting doctors for drug dealing. Doctors should therefore not
escape justice when they write opioid prescriptions without physical
examinations, trade sex for drugs, or prescribe pills in quantities so high that
no person could possibly ingest all of the pills.
The primary reason that prosecutors have declined to bring charges
against doctors who lost their medical licenses for drug dealing is simply a lack
of resources. Demonstrating that a doctor was dealing drugs requires showing
that she knowingly acted without a legitimate medical purpose and outside the
course of professional practice. Building that case typically requires witnesses,
a review of patient files, analysis from independent medical experts, and
possibly even DEA raids and undercover operations. Prosecutors—even
federal prosecutors—have limited time and resources however. Prosecutors
may believe that there are cases to be made against doctors who lost their
medical licenses, but simply lack the means to fully prepare and bring that
prosecution.
The solution to the under-prosecution of doctors in the opioid crisis is
therefore not to loosen the statutory language that requires proving there was
no legitimate medical purpose for the prescriptions. Nor is the answer to
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reduce the mens rea below the current threshold of “knowingly” acting without
a legitimate medical purpose. Loosening the statutory language or lowering the
mens rea would likely over-deter ethical doctors and give rise to (possibly
valid) objections that prosecutors hold too much power to prosecute doctors.
Instead, the solution is to provide adequate resources to prosecutors’
offices—at both the federal and state levels—so that prosecutors have the
capacity to bring criminal charges in all meritorious cases, rather than turning
away cases for lack of time or funding. States should make targeted funding
grants to counties with the greatest opioid problems. The federal government
should do the same and provide resources to hire additional prosecutors who
will focus only on white-collar opioid cases in opioid-ravaged districts across
the country. Congress and state legislatures should also be sure to provide
funding for medical experts—the backbone of physician drug-dealing cases—
who are currently in short supply.
To be sure, society’s primary goal should be to end the opioid crisis.
Policymakers must focus on treating the victims and preventing more needless
deaths. In doing so, however, we should not allow some of the main
protagonists in the epidemic to escape justice. If doctors acted as drug dealers,
they should be held accountable.

